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NEW  YORK 

Commission  to  devise 
the  government  of 


a  plan 
cities 


for 


Report, .•1877 


THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

LOS  ANGELES 


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REPORT 


Commission  to  Devise  a  Plan  for 
the  Government  of  Cities 


STA^TE    OF/NEW    YORK 


TRANSMITTED     TO     THE     LEGISLATURE     MARCH     6,     1877. 


I  OCT  2  3  1942  gf 


JEROME  B.  PARMENTER,  STATE  PRINTER. 

1877. 


Digitized  by  tine  Internet  Archive 

in  2008  witii  funding  from 

IVIicrosoft  Corporation 


http://www.arcliive.org/details/commissiondeviseOOnewy 


STATE    OF    NEW    YORK 


No.  68. 


IN    ASSEMBLY, 

March  6,  1877. 


REPORT 

OF  THE  COMMISSION  TO  DEVISE  A  PLAN  FOR  THE 
GOVERNMENT  OF  CITIES  IN  THE  STATE  OF  NEW 
YORK. 

Albany,  N.  Y.,  March  6,  1877. 

Hon.  George  B.  Sloan,  SpeaTcer  of  the  Assembly  :^ 

Sib.  —  In  obedience  to  the  instructions  of  the  commission  to  devise 
a  plan  for  the  government  of  cities  in  the  State  of  New  York,  I  have 
the  honor  to  hand  to  yon  herewith  the  report  of  said  commission. 

I  am,  sir,  very  respectfully, 

Your  obediant  servant. 

SIDNEY  DeKAY, 

Seci^etary. 
[Assembly,  No.  68.]  1 


JS 
REPORT. 


To  the  Senate  and  AssemMy  of  the  State  of  New  Tork  : 

Tlie  undersigned,  commissioners  appointed  by  the  Governor  of 
this  State,  pursuant  to  a  concurrent  resolution  of  the  Senate  and 
Assembl}',  passed  May  22,  1875,  to  devise  a  plan  for  the  govern- 
ment of  cities,  and  to  "report  the  same  to  the  Legislature,  respectfully 
present  the  following  report  : 

Origin  of  the  Commission. 

The  Governor,  in  a  special  message,  communicated  to  the  Legis- 
lature May  22,  1S75,  called  attention  to  the  evils  of  our  municipal 
systems,  and  the  necessity  of  adopting  a  permanent  and  uniform  plan 
for  the  government  of  the  cities  of  the  State,  and  recommended 
the  appointment  of  a  commission  to  consider  the  subject. 

On  the  same  day  a  concurrent  resolution  was  introduced  in  the 
Senate  and  adopted  by  the  Senate  and  Assembly,  which  was  in  these 
words: 

"  Whereas,  Tlie  Governor,  in  his  special  message  of  May  eleventli, 
iq  eighteen  hundred  and  seventy-five,  called  the  attention  of  the  Legis- 
2  lature  to  the  evils  arising  from  our  unstable  municipal  systems,  and 
H|  the  necessity  of  adopting  a  permanent  and  uniform  plan  for  the 
^  government  of  the  cities  of  the  State  ;  therefore 

"  Resolved  (if  the  Assembly  concur).  That  the  Governor  be,  and 
I^  hereby  is,  authorized  to  appoint  a  commission  of  not^  more  than 
M  twelve  persons,  whose  duty  it  shall  be  to  consider  the  subject  referred 
^  to  in  said  message,  to  devise  a  plan  for  the  government  of  cities,  and 
vJ  to  report  the  same  to  the  next  Legislature. 

S      ''Resolved,  That  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means  report  a 
oj  suitable  appropriation  to  defray  the  actual  expenses  of  the  commis- 
^   sion,  to  be  audited  by  the  Comptroller,  provided  that  the  commission 
^  shall  leceive  no  compensation  for  their  services." 
5       Twelve  persons  were  appointed  by  the  Governor  under  tlie  above 
^  resolution,  all  of  whom   except  President  Martin   B.   Anderson,  of 
o\  Rochester,  accepted  the  duty  thus  devolved  upon  them. 
S       The  commission  organized  immediately  after  their  appointment, 
S  and  the  lirst  ineetirig'was  held  on  the  fifteenth   day  of  December, 
2  187,5.     Mr.    William  M.  Evarts  was*  chosen  president  of  the  com- 
^  mission.     It  seemed  necessary  to  have  the  aid  of  some  suitable  per- 
son, not  a  member  of  the  commission,  to  keep   the  minutes  of  the 
proceedings,   conduct  the  correspondence,  and  have  charge  of  the 

863578 


,  4:  [Assembly. 

documents  of  the  body,  find  for  tliis   purpose,  Mr.  Sidney  DeKay,  of 
New  York,  was  selected. 

Its  Wokk. 

The  commission  proceeded  at  once  witli  the  ])erf()rniance  of  their 
task  b}'  assigning  to  the  several  inoiiibers  tlie  duty  of  making  investi- 
gations and  reports  upon  particular  branches  of  the  general  subject  of 
municipal  government.  They  hoped  to  be  able  to  bring  their  labors 
to  a  conclusion  in  season  to  present  their  report  to  the  Legislature  of 
1876 ;  but  they  were  of  the  opinion  that  but  little  value  could  be 
attached  to  the  recommendations  of  any  such  body,  unless  preceded 
by  the  most  deliberate  consideration  ;  and  such  was  the  magnitude 
of  the  subject  with  which  they  had  to  deal,  the  difficulties  with  which 
it  was  at  every  turn  beset,  and  the  earlier  diversity  of  opinion  among 
themselves,  that  they  found  it  impossible  to  accomplish  their  work 
before  the  adjournment  of  18Y6;  and  the  Legislature  of  that  year 
extended  the  time  for  the  making  of  their  report  to  the  present 
session. 

Notwithstanding  the  devotion,  since  that  period,  of  more  time 
than  before  to  their  task,  it  has  been  necessaril}'  protracted  to  the 
present  moment.  It  is  now  completed,  and  it  becomes  the  present 
duty  of  the  commission  to  submit  to  your  honorable  bodies  the 
results  of  their  labors,  together  M'ith  an  explanation  of  their  recon)- 
mendations,  and  a  statement  of  the  grounds  and  reasons  upon  which 
they  are  founded. 

The  message  of  Governor  Tilden,  of  May  11,  1875,  which  led  to 
the  creation  of  this  commission,  treats,  at  length,  of  the  history  and 
present  condition  of  the  governments  of  our  cities,  especially  that  of 
the  city  of  New  York  ;  of  the  mischiefs  and  public  burdens,  both  of 
debt  and  taxation,  under  which  these  communities  now  labor ;  and 
of  the  wide  departures  from  sound  principles  of  local  government 
which  have  marked  the  recent  administration  of  the  affairs  of  the 
metropolis.  The  concurrent  resolution  makes  it  the  duty  of  this 
commission  "  to  consider  the  subject  referred  to  in  said  message,  to 
devise  a  plan  for  the  government  of  cities,  and  to  report  the  same." 

The  purpose,  therefor,  of  the  Legislature,  in  passing  the  resolution, 
seems  ])]ainly  to  have  been  to  submit  the  whole  subject  of  the  local 
government  of  cities  to  that  deliberate  review  which  can,  it  may  be 
supposed,  be  best  given  to  it  by  a  small  nundjer  of  persons  specially 
delegated  for  that  purpose,  to  the  end  that  some  plan  of  administra- 
tion may  be  devised  which  may  compiend  itseU'  as  furnishing  the 
promise  of  a  permanent  improvement. 

The  Evils  Existing  in  the    Governments  of  Cities. 

The  first  step  to  be  taken  is  a  consideration  of  the  evils  which 
infest  the  administration  of  our  city  governments.  No  statement  or 
illustration  of  these  is  requisite  to  a  conviction  of  their  existence.  A 
clear  perception,  however,  of  these  evils  and  of  their  origin,  causes, 
connections  and  results  is  indispensable  to  any  useful  contrivance  for 


No.  68.]  .       .5 

their  redress.  It  will  tend  to  distinctness,  in  this  respect,  to  begin 
the  statement  with  the  last  results  of  bad  administration  as  they  reach 
and  become  burdens  upon  the  citizen;  and  afterwards  point' out  the 
causes  which  produce  them, 

FiKST,  The  accimmlation  of  permanent  municipal  debt.  —  The 
rapid  advances  is  this  direction  made  within  recent  years  are  alarm- 
ing. The  amount  of  the  permanent  debt  of  the  several  cities  of  this 
State,  embracing  in  round  numbers  a  population  of  2,000,000,  is 
upwards  of  $170,000,000,  the  annual  interest  upon  which  probably 
exceeds  $11,000,000.  The  whole  amount  appropriated  for  carrying 
on  the  government  of  the  State  in  1875,  exclusive  of  sums  appropri- 
ated to  extinguish  debt,  was  less  than  $9,000,000  —  much  less  than 
the  sum  which  the  cities  of  this  State  are  compelled  to  raise  to  pay 
the  interest  on  their  local  debts.  Much  the  larger  part  of  this  bur- 
den is  the  growth  of  recent  years.  The  enormous  debt  of  the  city 
of  New  York  is  especially  deserving  of  attention.  It  is  at  present, 
after  deducting  the  sinking  fund,  upward  of  $113,000,000,  and  witii- 
out  deducting  that  fund,  upward  of  $140,000,000.  The  appropria- 
tion for  the  present  year  to  pay  the  interest  thereon  is  upward  of 
$9,000,000  ;  an  amount  exceeding  the  entire  sum  requisite  to  defray 
all  the  expenses  of  the  State  government  for  the  present  year,  and 
exceeding  the  entire  expenditure  of  the  city  and  county  of  New 
York  for  a  year  so  recent  as  1860,  when  the  city  had  a  population  of 
800,000. 

The  magnitude  of  this  debt  is  even  less  alarming  than  the  rapidity 
of  its  recent  increase.  In  1840,  the  debt  of  the  city  was  about 
$10,000,000.  In  1850,  about  $12,000,000;  an  increase  during  the 
decade  of  about  twenty  per  cent.  In  1860  it  was  upward  of  $18,000,000, 
an  increase  of  fifty  per  cent.  In  1870  it  was  upward  of  $73,000,000, 
an  increase  of  nearly  400  per  cent ;  and  in  the  six  years  which  have 
since  elapsed,  it  has  been  swollen  by  the  -  enormous  addition  of 
$40,000,000.  It  is  proper  to  say  that  this  last  increase  is,  in  large 
measure,  due  to  the  funding  of  a  preceding  floating  debt  of  upwards 
of  $20,000,000  ;  a  legacy  from  the  corrupt  cabal  overthrown  in  1871, 
and  wliich,  or  most  of  which,  ought  to  be  added  to  the  amount  of 
the  debt,  as  above  stated,  in  1870. 

The  magnitude  and  rapid  increase  of  this  debt  are  not  less 
remarkal)le  than  the  poverty. of  the  results  exhibited  as  the  return 
for  so  prodigious  an  expenditure.  It  was  abundantly  sutheient  for 
the  construction  of  all  the  public  works  of  a  great  metropolis  for  a 
century  to  come,  and  to  have  adorned  it  besides  with  the  splendors 
of  architecture  and  art.  Instead  of  this,  the  wharves  and  piers  are, 
for  the  most  part,  temporary  and  perishable  structures  ;  the  streets 
are  poorly  paved ;  the  sewers  in  great  measure  imperfect,  insuf- 
ficient and  in  bad  order ;  the  public  buildings  shabby  and  inade- 
quate, and  there  is  little  which  the  citizen  can  regard  with  satisfac- 
tion, save  the  acqueduct  and  its  appurtenances  and  a  public  park. 
Even  these  should  not  be  said  to  be  the  product  of  the  public  debt; 
for  the  expense  occasioned  by  them  is,  or  should  have  been,  for  the 
most  part,  already  extinguished.     In  truth,   the  public  debt  of  the 


6  [Assembly 

city  of  New  York,  or  the  larger  part  of  it,  represents  a  vast  aggre- 
gate of  moneys  wasted,  embezzled  or  misapplied. 

Second.  The  excessive  increase  of  the  aimual  expenditure  for 
ordinary  pu^yoses.  —  This  evil  is  of  similar  character  to  the  one 
already  dealt  with,  and  points  to  like  disastrous  results.  It  would 
too  greatly  extend  the  length  of  this  report  to  present,  under  this 
head,  the  statistics  of  the  various  cities  of  the  State,  as  they  are 
exhibited  in  the  statement  annexed  to  the  special  message  of  the 
Governor ;  but  the  example  of  the  metropolis  may  be  again  referred 
to.  There  is  a  fitness  in  such  reference  arising  from  the  considera- 
tion that  New  York  city  embraces  one-half  the  urban  population, 
and  something  approaching  one-half  in  value  of  the  entire  property 
of  the  State.  Any  measure,  therefore,  that  may  be  devised  _  for 
improving  the  administration  of  cities  would  be  wholly  insufficient 
unless  it  furnished  a  remedy  for  the  abuses  of  misgovernment  in  that 
city.  It  is  believed,  moreover,  that  an  increase  in  the  annual  expen- 
diture similar  to  that  which  has  there  taken  place  characterizes 
the  financial  history  of  all  the  cities  of  the  State.  Such  increase  has 
not,  at  least  in  most  of  them,  kept  pace  with  that  of  the  metro- 
polis ;  but  it  is  everywhere  sufficient  to  justify  the  gravest  atten- 
tion. 

Going  back  through  a  period  of  fifty  years,  we  find  that  in  1816, 
when  New  York  had  a  population  of  upward  of  100,000,  and  tax- 
able property  to  the  amount  of  $82,000,000,  the  amount  raised  by 
taxation  was  $344,802.44,  considerably  less  than  one-half  of  one  per 
cent.  Twenty  years  later,  in  1836,  the  population  had  increased 
to  upward  of  270,000,  and  the  taxable  property  to  upward  of 
$309,000,000.  The  amount  raised  in  that  year  was  $1,085^,130.44, 
which  was  but  thirty-five  one-hundredths  of  one  per  cent.  The  debt 
at  that  time  was  $1,282,103.58,  and  the  amount  requisite  to  pay  the 
interest  upon  this  did  not  much  exceed  $72,000.  In  the  sixteen  sub- 
sequent years,  down  to  1850,  the  population  rapidly  increased,  and 
the  amount  raised  by  tax  to  defray  ordinary  expenditures  increased 
somewhat  more  rapidly.  In  the  last  mentioned  year,  with  a  popula- 
tion of  515,000,  the  tax  levy  was  $3,230,085.02.  The  property,  how- 
ever, as  valued  for  taxation,  had  not  increased  ;  indeed  tlie  estimate 
was  less,  being  something  over  $286,000,000,  and  consequently  the 
rate  of  taxation  on  that  estimate  was  J. 13  per  cent.  The  debt  had 
risen  to  upward  of  $12,000,000,  and  consequently  made  a  draft  upon 
the  annual  tax  levy  of  upward  of  $700,000. 

During  the  decade  between  1850  and  1860  the  increase  was  more 
rapid.  In  the  latter  year,  with  a  population  of  814,000,  a  tax  levy 
of  $9,758,507.86  was  ordered ;  an  increase  of  300  per  cent  above 
that  of  1850  ;  and  notwithstanding  that  the  valuation  of  property 
had  in  the  same  period  doubled,  so  as  to  aniount  to  upward  of 
$576,000,000,  the  rate  increased  from  1.13  per  cent  in  1850  'to  1.69 
in  1860.  At  the  same  time  the  debt  increased  upward  of  $6,000,000, 
amounting  in  the  year  last  named  to  upward  of  $18,000,000.  Obser- 
vers of  the  local  government  and  politics  of  the  metropolis,  during 
this  period,  will  remember  that  it  was  the  time  when  the  local  man- 


No.  68.]  7 

agers  first   organized    on    a   large   scale  their   schemes  to  control, 
through  compact  political  arrangements,  the  management  and  dis- 
tribution of  the  revenues  of  the  city,  which  then  amounted  to  so 
large  a  sum  ;   and  it  may  be  said  that  from  that  time  to  the  present, 
with  the  exception  of  one  short  bat  memorable  period,  the  disi)osition 
of  these  revenues  has  remained   substantially  in  the  hands  of  the 
chiefs  of  trained  political  organizations,  which  are  mainly  supported, 
in  some  form  or  other,  from  this  fund.     When  we  consider  what  the 
nature  of  this  guardianship  is,  it  should  not  excite  surprise  that,  at 
the  close  of  the  next  decade  after  1860,  the  annual  burden  had  risen 
to  the  enormous  figures  of  $23,361,674,  compelling  a  levy  of  2.17 
per  cent  of  the  entire  property  of  the  city  ;    while  during  the  same 
period  the  debt  had  also  risen  from  eighteen  to  seventy-three  millions. 
As  already  mentioned,  this  statement  of  the  increase  of  the  debt  is 
far  beneath  the  fact,  for  upon  the  overthrow,  in  1871,  of  the  corrupt 
officials  then  in  the  possession  of  every  branch  of  the  city  govern- 
ment,  there  was  found  an  existing  floating  indebtedness  of  some 
twenty  millions  more,  to  pay  which  bonds  were  subsequently  issued, 
and  which  constitnte  a  large  part  of  the  subsequent  increase  of  the 
bonded  debt.     Since  the  year  1871  there  has  been,  on  the  part  at 
least  of  some  of  the  city  officials,  an  earnest  endeavor,  which  is  still 
coutinned,  to  arrest  the  further  increase  of  the  debt,  and  to  cut  down 
the  annual  expenditure ;    but  these  efforts,  though  very  useful,  have 
been  counteracted  by  the  want  of  general  co-operation  on  the  part  of 
all  otticers,  by  the  ruinous  condition  in  which  the  preceding  govern- 
ment had  left  the  aff'airs  of  the  city,  and  by  the  existence  of  laws 
enacted  by  the  Legislature  permitting,  if  not  requiring,  extensive 
so-called  improvements  to  be  carried  on,  the  expense  to  be  defrayed 
by  the  farther  issue  of  bonds. 

'  We,  therefore,  find  that  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  year, 
1877,  the  debt  of  the  city  had  increased  to  the  amount  of  $113,000,000, 
and  the  total  amount  of  the  tax  levy  ordered  for  the  year  1877  is 
$28,484,269.44,  which  requires  a  rate  of  taxation  of  2.67  per  cent 
upon  the  amount  of  taxable  property.  In  addition  to  this,  there  is 
also  appropriated  out  of  the  general  resources  of  the  city,  receivable 
in  1877  from  other  sources'than  taxation,  the  sum  of  $2,5CO,000, 
which  makes  the  amount  of  estimated  expenditure  $30,984,269.48. 
It  is  important  to  know  hpw  much  of  this  vast  sum  is  devoted  to 
ordinary  objects  of  annual  expenditure. 

Whole  amount  appropriated $30,9845  269  48 

Deduct  State  taxes $2,  658,900  00 

"       interest  on  debt,  with  install- 
ment of  principal 9jl765501  73 

"       for    redemption    of    special 

parts  of  debt Ij545,467  78 

13,380,869  51 

Amount  applicable  to  annual  expenditure $17,603,399  97 


8  [Assembly 

These  figures  are  most  significant.  In  1810,  with  a  population  of 
nearly  100,000  and  a  taxable  valuation  of  $25,000,000,  the  amount 
of  ordinary  expenditure  was  but  $129,727.15,  or  about  one-half  of 
one  per  cent  upon  the  valuation,  and  about  $1.25  for  each  inhabitant. 
This  was  a  period  of  regularity  and  economy.  Twenty  years  later, 
in  1S30,  when  the  ])opulation  had  increased  to  202,000  and  the  tax- 
able property  to  upward  of  $125,000,000,  the  annual  expenditure 
was  $509,1  T8.4'i,  about  two  dollars  to  each  inhabitant,  and  an  actual 
decrease  of  the  rate  of  tax.  Twenty  years  later,  in  1850,  we  reach 
a  period  when,  as  the  annals  of  the  metropolis  at  that  time,  and  the 
recollections  of  those  yet  living,  who  were  then  familiar  with  its 
affairs,  will  attest,  a  marked  decline  had  occurred,  through  a  great 
deterioration  in  the  standing  and  character  of  the  city  officers,  bring- 
ing Avith  it  waste,  extravagance  and  corruption.  Still,  with  a  popu- 
lation at  that  time  of  upward  of  half  a  million,  and  taxable  property 
of  upward  of  $286,000,000,  two  and  a  half  millions  sufficed  for  the 
ordinary  annual  expenditure,  exclusive  of  interest  upon  debt,  but 
including  all  State  taxes.  This  was  five  dollars  for  each  inhabitant, 
and  called  for  a  tax  rate  of  less  than  one  per  cent. 

It  thus  appears  that  the  present  annual  expenditure  for  the  pur- 
poses of  ordinary  administration,  exclusive  of  interest  upon  debt,  as 
exhibited  by  the  annual  estimate  for  the  purpose  of  determining  the 
tax  levy,  amounts  to  more  than  twenty  millions  of  dollars,  or  about 
twenty  dollars  for  each  inhabitant,  and  requires  a  tax  rate  of  nearly 
two  per  cent  upon  the  present  valuation  of  taxable  property. 

But  this  apparent  increase  of  the  annual  expenditure,  as  shown  by 
the  annual  appropriations,  is  far  less  than  the  actual  increase. 
Enormous  sums  are  every  year  exacted  from  the  property  owners  in 
the  form  of  special  assessments  upon  property  assunjed  to  be  spec- 
ially benefited,  which  do  not  appear  in  any  form  in  the  present 
general  budget.  The  sums  thus  expended  are  for  the  opening,  regu- 
lating, grading  and  paving  of  streets,  and  the  construction  of 
sewers,  etc.,  etc.  Inasmuch  as  this  expenditure  is  not  an  annual,  but 
a  continuous  one,  the  yearly  amount  cannot  be  stated.  It  is  safe, 
liowever,  to  say,  that  taking  the  period  of  the  past  ten  years,  it  has 
been  equ-ivalent  to  a  yearly  sum  of  millions  of  dollars.  Some  of 
this  exi)enditurc  is  fairly  to  be  carried  to  the  account  of  capital,  as 
being  a  permanent  improvement  of  i)roperty  ;  but  a  very  large  part 
of  it:  belongs  to  the  account  of  ordinary  repairs,  and  swells  the  true 
statement  of  the  present  annual  expenditure  to  a  far  greater  sum 
than  is  above  set  down. 

We  are  thus  confronted  with  the  alarming  fact  that  the  increase 
in  the  annual  expenditure  since  1850,  as  compared  with  the  increase 
of  population,  is  more  than  400  per  cent;  and  as  compared  with  the 
increase  of  taxable  ])roi)erty,  more  than  200  per  cent.  Some  allow- 
ance is  doubtless  to  be  made  for  the  more  complete  provision  now 
made  for  the  public  wants,  and  for  the  inferior  value  of  the  currency 
in  which  our  present  expenditure  is  stated;  but  this  consideration 
does  not  aflfect  the  ratio  of  taxation  to  the  value  of  the  property 
taxed,    nor   defeat   the   conclusion    that  we  have,  during  the  past 


No.  68.]  9 

twenty-five  years,  not  only  made  a  wide  departure  from  the  economy 
of  earlier  and  better  days,  and  have  outrun  all  former  examples  of 
wastefulness,  extravagance  and  corrupt  administration. 

The  significance  of  this  rapid  increase  of  debt  and  taxation  must 
not  be  overlooked  or  misapprehended  ;  nor  its  certain  consequence, 
if  not  arrested. 

But  the  deplorable  financial  condition  of  our  principal  cities,  to 
which  we  have  given  such  prominence,  lias  causes,  a  clear  perce])tion 
of  which  must  precede  any  intelligent  action  in  contriving  remedies. 
We  desire  to  avoid  in  this  division  of  our  subject,  so  far  as  possible, 
all  matters  upon  which  differences  of  opinion  are  likely  to  arise,  and 
shall  therefore  refer,  not  to  the  more  remote,  and,  perhaps,  funda- 
mental causes,  but  to  those  which  are  direct,  immediate  and  palpa- 
ble, the  operation  of  which  can  be  clearly  pointed  out. 

Causes  of  the  Existing  Evils. 

First.  Incomjyetent  and  unfaithful  governing  hoards  and  officers. 
— We  place  at  the  head  of  the  list  of  evils  under  which  our  municipal 
administration  labors,  the  fact  that  so  large  a  number  of  important 
offices  have  come  to  be  filled  by  men  possessing  little,  if  any,  fitness 
for  the  important  duties  they  are  called  upon  to  discharge.  This 
fact  will  hardly  be  questioned  by  any  intelligent  observer.  We  do 
not  mean  that  great  merits  and  devotion  to  public  duty  are  not  in 
many  instances,  here  and  there  and  from  time  to  time,  exhibited  in 
public  station.  But  Ave  do  mean  that  there  is  a  general  failure, 
especially  in  the  larger  cities,  to  secure  the  election  or  appointment 
of  fit  and  competent  officials.  The  selection  of  fit  and  competent 
officers  is  not  sought  in  the  practices  which  have  long  been  in  vogue, 
and  which  for  the  most  part  actually  govern  in  the  choice  of  muni- 
cipal officers.  It  can  hardly  be  expected,  therefore,  that  such  will  be 
secured. 

The  various  forms  of  mischief  resulting  from  a  public  service  thus 
filled  are  numberless  ;  but  they  uniformly  present  the  common  feature 
of  increasing  either  debt  or  taxation,  or  botii.  These  unworthy 
holders  of  })ublic  trusts  gain  their  places  by  their  own  exertions. 
The  voluntary  sufi'rage  of  their  fellow  citizens  would  never  have 
lifted  them  into  office.  Animated  by  the  expectation  of  unlawful 
emoluments  they  expend  large  sums  to  secure  their  places  and  make 
promises  beforehand  to  supporters  and  retainers  to  furnish  patronage 
or  place.  The  money  expended  to  secure  election  must  be  paid.  The 
corrupt  promises  must  be  redeemed.  Anticipated  gains  must  be 
realized.  Hence,  old  and  educated  subordinates  must  be  dismissed, 
and  new  ])laces  created  to  satisfy  the  crowd  of  friends  and  retainers. 
Pi-ofitaI)le  contracts  must  be  awarded  and  n.eedless  public  works 
must  be  undertaken.  The  forms  of  law  are  evaded,  or  shaped  for  the 
purpose  of  conferring  the  patronage  upon  favorites  ;  and  the  various 
departments  of  administration,  instead  of  striving  to  make  the  burden 
of  government  as  light  as  possible,  engage  in  a  contention  to  draw 
within  their  own  control  the  largest  possible  part  of  the  public 
resources.     The  amounts  required  to  satisfy  these  illegitimate  objects 


10  [Assembly 

enter  into  the  estimates  upon  which  taxation  is  eventually  based ;  in 
fact  they  constitute,  in  many  instances,  a  superior  lien  upon  the 
money's  appropriated  for  pjovernment,  and  not  until  they  are  in  some 
manner  satisfied,  do  the  real  wants  of  the  public  receive  attention. 
It  is  speedily  found  that  these  unlawful  denumds,  to_<>;ether  with  the 
necessities  of  the  public,  call  for  a  sum,  which,  if  taken  at  once  by 
taxation,  would  produce  dissatisfaction  and  alarm  in  the  community, 
and  bring  public  indignation  upon  the  authors  of  such  burdens.  For 
the  purpose  of  averting  such  consequences,  divers  pretenses  are  put 
forward  suggesting  the  propriety  of  raising  means  for  alleged  excep- 
tional purposes  by  loans  of  money,  and  in  the  end  the  taxes  are 
reduced  to  a  figure  not  calculated  to  arouse  the  public  to  action,  and 
any  failure  thus  to  raise  a  sufficient  sum  is  supplied  by  an  issue  of 
bonds. 

It  may  be  thought  that  this  picture  of  mal-administration  is  over- 
drawn. We  believe  it  to  be  a  just  one — not,  indeed,  of  the  admin- 
istration of  all  our  cities,  or  of  the  administration  of  any  of  these — 
at  all  times.  But  it  fails  altogether  to  convey  an  adequate  notion  of 
the  elaborate  systems  of  depredation,  which,  under  the  name  of  city 
governments,  have  from  time  to  time  afflicted  our  principal  cities; 
and  it  is,  moreover,  a  just  indication  of  tendencies  in  operation  in  all 
our  cities,  and  which  are  certain,  unless  arrested,  to  gather  increased 
force,  arid  from  time  to  time  to  develop  to  an  excessive  degree.  It 
would  be  clearly  within  bounds  to  say  that  more  than  one-half  of  all 
the  present  city  debts  are  the  direct  results  of  the  species  of  inten- 
tional and  corrupt  misrule  above  described. 

But  were  we  to  leave  out  of  view  the  existence  of  corrupt  pur- 
poses, the  share  of  public  burdens  and  mischiefs  properly  chargeable 
upon  incompetent  and  unfaithful  officials  would  not  be  diminished. 
It  would  only  oblige  us  to  say  that  the  present  volume  of  debt  and 
excessive  rate  of  taxation  has  been  brought  about  b}'  incompetence 
and  neglect,  instead  of  by  corruption  and  fraud.  This  neither 
diminishes  the  evil,  affects  the  conclusion  as  to  the  source  from  which 
it  proceeds,  nor  lessens  the  necessity  for  a  remedy.  The  exclusion 
of  positive  fraud  and  corruption  from  civil  business  is  by  no  means 
sufficient  to  secure  good  administration.  Human  affairs  nowhere 
take  care  of  themselves.  The  necessary  conditions  of  thrift  in 
public  as  "well  as  private  business  are  the  ])resent  care,  attention  and 
skill  of  those  who  feel  that  their  personal  interests  are  directly 
involved  in  its  successful  management.  We  do  not  believe  that,  had 
the  cities  of  this  State  during  the  last  twenty-five  years  had  the 
benefit  of  the  presence  in  the  various  departments  of  local  adminis- 
tration of  the  services  of  competent  and  faith iul  officers,  the  aggre- 
gate of  municipal  debts  would  have  amounted  to  one-third  of  the 
present  sum,  nor  the  annual  taxation  one-half  of  its  present 
amount;  while  the  condition  of  those  cities  in  respect  to  existing 
provisions  for  the  public  needs  would  have  been  far  superior  to  what 
is  now  exhibited.  It  may  be  regarded  as  certain  that  unless  some 
means  be  adopted  to  secure,  not  occasionally  and  by  special  and 
spasmodic  popular  effort,  but  permanently  and  in   the  natural  and 


No.  68.]  11 

regular  course  of  affairs,  a  better  class  of  city  officers,  the  experience 
of  tlie  past  twenty-five  years  will  be  repeated  in  the  next,  possibly, 
not  with  such  an  enormous  increase  of  debt  and  taxation,  l)ut  tlie 
tendency  will  be  in  the  same  direction,  and  the  evils  under  whicli  we 
suffer  will  not  be  substantially  arrested. 

Second.  The  introduction  of  State  and  national  politics  into 
Tntinicipal  affairs.  —  This  practice  of  our  times  stands  next  in  the 
order  of  priority  as  a  source  of  mischief.  We  assign  this  distinction 
to  it,  not  so  much  because  it  is  an  evil  in  itself,  but  because  in  the 
mischievous  use  which  is  made  of  it,  a  use  which  cannot  be  pre- 
vented, it  becomes  the  most  potent  means  by  which  all  eff'orts  to 
improve  the  character  of  the  municipal  service  at  popular  elections 
are  frustrated.  It  is  the  most  fruitful  source  of  the  prime  evil  already 
dealt  with,  namely,  the  presence  in  the  civil  service  of  incompetent 
and  unfaithful  officers. 

Party  divisioi;s  arise,  or,  at  least,  properly  arise,  only  when  men 
differ  in  respect  to  some  general  principles  or  methods  of  State  policy. 
Differences  exist  as  to  the  extent  of  the  respective  powers  of  the 
national  and  State  governments,  as  to  the  expediency  of  free  trade, 
as  to  the  extent  to  which  government  should  limit  individual  liberty, 
as  to  the  general  methods  of  administering  the  large  concerns  of  our 
national  and  State  governments;  and  similar  questions  which  can  be 
settled  only  by  the  triumph  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  contending 
parties.  The  formation  of  general  parties  upon  such  questions  is 
useful,  or,  at  all  events,  inevitable.  But  it  is  rare,  indeed,  that  any 
such  questions,  or  any  upon  which  good  men  ought  to  differ,  arise  in 
connection  with  tlie  conduct  of  municipal  affairs.  Good  men  can- 
tiot  and  do  not  differ  as  to  whether  municipal  debt  ought  to  be 
restricted,  extravagance  checked,  and  municipal  affiiirs  lodged  in  the 
hands  of  faithful  and  competent  officers.  There  is  no  more  just  rea- 
son why  the  control  of  the  public  works  of  a  great  city  should  be 
lodged  in  the  hands  of  a  democrat  or  a  re])ublican,  than  there  is  whj' 
an  adherent  of  one  or  the  other  of  the  great  parties  should  be  made 
the  superintendent  of  a  business  corporation.  In  the  case  of  the  lat- 
ter, the  sole  purpose  of  the  parties  interested  is  to  secure  the  services 
of  the  best  man,  and  the  best  man  is  consequently  secured.  Good 
citizens,  interested  in  honest  municipal  government,  can  secure  that 
only  by  acting  together.  Political  divisions  separate  them  at  the 
start,  and  rendei*  it  impossible  to  secure  the  object  desired  e(|ually  by 
both.  This  truth  is  naturally  recognized  in  every  emergency,  when, 
by  reason  of  startling  abuses  in  municipal  affairs,  the  community  is 
aroused  to  the  necessity  for  a  change  in  local  officers.  A  general 
out-cry  is  at  once  raised  calling  upon  citizens  to  act  independently  of 
party,  and,  sometimes,  although  rarelj^  the  shackles  are  thrown  off 
and  success  is  achieved.  This  obstacle  to  the  union  of  good  citizens 
should  not  exist.  It  paralyzes  all  ordinary  efforts  for  good  municipal 
government. 

The  motives  which  lead  to  a  pushing  of  these  general  political 
divisions  to  their  present    mischievous    extremes  should  be  clearly 


12  .  [Assembly 

comprehended.     They  are  exceedingly  powerful,  and  will  not  yield 
to  ordinary  resistance  : 

1.  The  i^reat  prizes,  in  the  shape  of  place  and  power,  which  are 
oiFered  on  the  hroad  fields  of  State  and  national  politics,  offer  the 
strongest  incentives  to  ambition.  Personal  advancement  is,  in  these 
fields,  naturally  associated  with  the  achievement  of  great  public 
objects,  and  neither  end  can  be  secured  except  through  the  success  of 
a  political  i)arty  to  which  tliey  ai'c  attached.  The  strife  thus  engen- 
dered develops  into  a  general  battle  in  which  each  side  feels  that  it 
cannot  afford  to  allow  any  odds  to  the  other.  If  one  seeks  to  turn 
to  its  advantage  the  patronage  of  municipal  office,  tlie  other  must 
carry  the  contest  into  the  same  sphere.  It  is  certain  tliat  tiie  tempta- 
tion will  be  withstood  by  neither.  It  thus  becomes  tlie  direct  interest 
of  the  foremost  men  of  the  nation  to  constantly  keep  their  forces  in 
hostile  array,  and  these  must  be  fed  by,  among  other  ways,  the  patron- 
age to  be  secured  by  the  control  of  local  affairs.  The  concei-ns  which 
fill  the  imaginations  of  ambitious  men  are  deemed  supreme,  and 
sufficient  to  justify  the  partial  sacrifice  of  subordinate  and  local 
interests.  This  is  a  grave  error,  engendered  by  the  existing  political 
conditions  of  city  government  arrangements. 

2.  Next  to  this  small  number  of  leading  men,  there  is  a  large  class 
who,  though  not  dishonest  or  devoid  of  public  spirit,  are  led  by  habit 
and  temperament  to  take  a  wholly  partisan  view  of  city  affairs. 
Their  enjoyment  of  party  struggles,  their  devotion  to  those  who 
share  with  them  triumphs  and  defeats  of  the  political  game  are  so 
intense,  that  they  gradually  lose  sight  of  the  ol)ject  for  which  parties 
exist,  or  ought  to  exist ;  and  considerable  proportions  of  them,  in 
their  devotion  to  politics,  suffer  themselves  to  be  driven  from  the 
walks  of  regular  industry,  and  at  last  become  dependent  for  their 
livelihood  on  the  patronage  in  the  hands  of  their  chiefs.  Mingled 
with  them  is  nearly  as  large  a  number  to  whom  politics  is  simply  a 
mode  of  making  a  liveliliood,  or  a  fortune,  and  who  take  part  in 
political  contests  without  enthusiasm,  and  often  without  the  pretense 
of  interest  in  the  public  welfare,  and  devote  themselves  openly  to 
the  organization  of  the  vicious  elements  of  society,  in  combinations 
strong  enough  to  hold  the  balance  in  a  closely  contested  election, 
overawe  the  political  leaders,  and  secure  a  fair  share  of  the  municipal 
patronage,  or  else  extort  immunity  from  the  officers  of  the  law. 

3.  The  rest  of  the  community,  embracing  the  huge  majority  of 
the  more  thrifty  classes,  averse  to  engaging  in  what  they  deem  the 
"  low  business  "  of  politics,  or  hopeless  of  accomplishing  any  sub- 
stantial good  in  the  face  of  such  powerful  opposing  interests,  for  the 
most  part  content  themselves  with  acting  in  accordance  with  their 
respective  parties.  When  a  municipal  election  occurs,  most  of  them 
easily  persuade  themselves  that,  as  the  only  question  is,  which  of  the 
two  parties  is  to  have  the  control  of  local  afiairs,  it  is,  of  course, 
best  that  such  control  should  be  lodged  with  their  own  ;  and  it  is 
some  satisfaction  to  them,  when  no  other  good  can  be  achieved,  to 
gain  a  small  political  triumph.  Others,  troubled  with  the  sense  that 
a  duty  is  imposed  upon  them  to  vote  for  meritorious  candidates  feebly 


No.  68.]  13 

and  vainly  labor  on  the  mornins:  of  the  election  to  discriminate 
between  the  respective  merits  of  obscure  contestants.  Some  few  rise 
to  the  virtue  of  seasonable  inquiry,  and  conc:ratulate  themselves 
upon  the  performance  of  the  solemn  duty  of  replacing  ji  notoriously 
unworthy  name,  by  some  selection  of  their  own.  The  usually 
meager  return  of  scattering  votes  is  the  measure  of  the  ethciency  of 
this  class  of  citizens. 

It  is  through  the  agency  of  the  great  political  i->arties,  organized 
and  operating  as  above  described,  that  our  municipal  officers  are,  and 
long  have  been  selected.  It  can  scarcely  be  matter  of  wonder,  then, 
that  the  present  condition  of  municipal  affairs  should  present  an 
aspect  so  desperate. 

Third.  The  assumption  ly  the  Legislature  of  the  direct  control 
of  local  affairs.  —  This  legislative  intervention  has  necessarily 
involved  a' disregard  of  one  of  the  most  fu^idamental  principles  of 
republican  government.  We  entertain  no  doubt  that  this  interven- 
tion has  greatly  aggravated  the  evils  which  it  was,  in  many  instances, 
designed  to  remove.  There  are  some  established  truths  relating  to 
this  subject  of  which  the  public  needs  to  be  reminded  in  order  to 
perceive  what  a  Vvide  and  dangerous  departure  from  sound  methods 
of  government  is  thus  made. 

Our  existing  system  of  national  and  State  government  stands  fully 
accepted  by  us  as  the  most  perfect,  and,  practically,  the  best  adapted 
to  our  wants.  In  any  effort,  therefore,  to  cure  incidental  evils  aris- 
ing from  defects  in  the  details  of  the  structure,  we  should  take  care 
not  to  disturb  the  foundations  or  endanger  its  perpetuity. 

The  system  of  government  by  municipalities  is  inlierent  in  our 
free  institutions.  In  separate  communities  existing  as  integral  parts 
of  the  commonwealth,  but  having  local  interests  which  immediately 
concern  themselves  rather  than  the  State  at  large,  the  instinct  of  self- 
government  has  always  asserted  itself  in  some  way  as  the  basis  of 
their  organic  life.  From  this  vital  germ  have  sprung  the  municipal- 
ities winch  in  every  civilized  State  have  claimed  and  exercised  the 
right,  sometimes  granted  as  a  concession  of  sovereign  power  and 
sometimes  extorted  by  superior  force,  of  administering  law  and 
government  in  respect  to  their  local  affairs,  while  retaining  their 
allegiance  as  members  of  the  whole  nation.  This  element  of  local 
administration  in  local  affairs  entered  into  the  framework  of  our 
constitutional  government  at  the  outset,  and  was  the  most  marked 
characteristic  of  the  national  life,  reproduced  and  existing  in  this 
State  and  in  most  of  the  States  of  the  Union  at  the  time  of  the 
establishment  of  their  independence.  De  Tocqueville,  than  whom 
no  observer  has  been  better  qualilied  to  compare  the  arrangements 
of  this  country  with  those  of  Europe,  was  greatly  impressed  with  the 
town  institutions  of  New  England.  He  regarded  them  as  the  real 
foundation  of  American  liberty.  "  Assemblies  of  citizens,"  he  says, 
"  constitute  the  strength  of  free  nations.  Municipal  institutions  are  to 
liberty  what  primary  schools  are  to  science — they  bring  it  ^yithiu 
the  people's  reach  ;  they  teach  men  how  to  use  and  how  to  enjoy  it. 
A  nation  may  establish  a  system  of  free  government,  but  without 


14  [Assembly 

the  spirit  of  mniiicipal  institutions  it  cannot  have  the  spirit  of 
liberty." 

The  line  which  separates  the  functions  of  the  central  leo;islature 
from  tliose  which  should  be  discharged  by  local  government  boards 
is  sufficiently  distinct.  Whatever  concerns  the  rights  of  all  the 
citizens  of  the  State  in  respect  either  of  person  or  of  property, 
belongs  to  the  central  authority,  which  is  also  charged  with  the  duty 
of  devising  uniform  plans  by  which  the  affairs  of  the  various  local 
divisions  of  the  State  may  be  administered  by  the  people  of  those 
divisions.  The  representatives  elected  to  the  central  legislature  are 
chosen  expressly  for  the  purpose  of  attending  to  these  general  duties. 

There  are  obvious  reasons  why  they  ought  not  to  be  charged  with 
the  direction  of  the  local  affairs  of  the  municipalities  : 

1.  They  have  not  the  requisite  time.  When  the  importance  and 
variety  of  their  duties  in  respect  to  the  improvement  and  amend- 
ment of  the  general  body  of  the  laws,  the  correction  of  general  evils, 
the  conduct  of  the  great  public  works  of  the  State,  and  the  adminis- 
tration of  the  various  departments  of  the  State  government,  are 
considered,  no  one  will  think  that  they  are  not  sufficiently  burdened 

■  witli   these  duties,  or  that  tiiey  can  have  any  sufficient  leisure  to 
devote  to  the  special  affairs  of  particular  localities. 

2.  They  have  not  the  requisite  knowledge  of  details.  Whether 
it  is  best  in  any  particular  city  to  open  a  street  or  avenue,  or  con- 
struct an  aqueduct,  or  any  other  public  work  requiring  the  expenditure 
of  money,  cannot  be  determined  without  an  accurate  knowledge  of 
the  affairs  of  the  locality  —  of  the  extent  of  present  accommodation 
—  of  the  demand  for  increased  facilities  —  of  the  actual  wishes  of  the 
inhabitants  —  of  the  extent  of  existing  public  burdens,  and  of  a 
variety  of  other  details,  wliich  are  usually  possessed  only  by  residents 
of  the  locality. 

Consequently,  when  a  local  bill  is  under  consideration  in  the  Legis- 
lature, its  care  and  explanation  are  left  exclusively  to  the  representa- 
tives of  the  locality  to  which  it  is  applicable,  and  sometimes  by 
express,  more  often  by  tacit,  understanding,  local  bills  are  "  log- 
rolled "  through  the  houses.  Thus  legislative  duty  is  delegated  to 
the  local  representatives,  who,  acting  frequently  in  combination  with 
the  sinister  elements  of  their  constituency,  shift  the  responsibility  for 
wn"ong-doing  from  themselves  to  the  Legislature. 

3.  But,  what  is  even  more  important,  the  general  representatives 
have  not  that  sense  of  personal  interest  and  personal  responsibility 
to  their  constituents,  which  are  indispensable  to  the  intelligent 
administration  of  local  affairs.  And  yet  the  judgment  of  the  local 
governing  bodies  in  various  parts  of  the  State,  and  the  wishes  of 
their  constituents,  are  liable  to  be  overruled  by  the  votes  of  legis- 
lators living  at  the  distance  of  a  hundred  miles 

These  considerations  lead  to  the  conclusion  that  the  original  elec- 
tion or  appointment  of  all  local  governing  bodies,  the  duty  of  watch- 
ing or  checking  them,  and  the  duty  of  providing,  or  the  discretion  of 
withholding,  the  supplies  necessary  for  the  operations,  should  rest, 
not  with  the  central  legislature,  but  with  the  people  of  the  locality. 


No.  68.]  15 

It  wonld,  indeed,  seem  scarcely  necessary  to  ari^ne  against  this 
exercise  by  the  State  Legislature  of  inappropriate  functions,  when  it 
stands  deliberately  condemned,  not  only  by  the  conclusions  of  all 
thoughtful  writers  upon  republican  government,  but  by  the  people 
themselves  in  the  Constitution  under  which  we  now  live. 

Among  the  mischievous  consequences  which  flow  from  this  vicious 
practice,  we  may  further  mention  the  following : 

4.  The  occupation  of  the  central  legislative  body  with  the  con- 
sideration of  a  multitude  of  special  measures  relating  to  local  affairs, 
some  good,  probably  the  larger  part  bad,  pressed  upon  their  attention 
by  those  specially  interested  in  them.  The  time  which  should  be 
devoted  to  the  thorough  consideration  of  measures  affecting  the 
general  laws  and  policy  of  the  State  is  invaded  and  wasted,  to  the 
manifest  injury  of  those  general  interests  which  it  is  the  exclusive 
province  of  the  Legislature  to  defend.  To  this  cause  arc  to  be 
ascribed  the  haste,  error  and  imperfection  wdiich  have  characterized 
much  of  our  recent  legislation  upon  all  subjects,  and  which  will 
continue  to  characterize  it  until  the  Legislature  restricts  its  action 
within  its  true  limits. 

To  appreciate  the  extent  of  the  mischief  in  this  direction,  one  has 
only  to  take  up  the  Session  Laws  of  any  year,  at  random,  and  notice 
the  subjects  to  which  they  relate.  Of  the  808  acts  passed  in  1870, 
for  instance,  212  are  acts  relating  to  cities  and  villages,  ninety-four 
of  which  relate  to  cities,  and  thirty-six  to  the  city  of  New  York 
alone.  A  still  larger  number  have  reference  to  the  city  of  Brooklyn. 
These  212  acts  occupy  more  than  three-fourths  of  the  two  thousand 
pages  of  the  laws  of  that  year.  If  the  time  requisite  for  the  membei-s 
of  the  Legislature  to  comprehend  their  provisions  and  acquire  the 
information  necessary  to  form  a  judgment  concerning  the  expediency 
of  adopting  tliem  had  been  given  to  the  work,  the  entire  session 
would  hardly  have  sufficed  for  the  purpose. 

The  multiplicity  of  laws  relating  to  the  same  subjects,  thus 
brought  into  existence,  is  itself  an  evil  of  great  magnitude.  AVhat 
the  law"  is  concerning  some  of  the  most  important  interests  of  our 
principal  cities,  can  be  ascertained  only  by  the  exercise  of  the  patient 
researcli  of  professional  lawjxrs.  To  the  citizen  it  is  a  sealed  book. 
The  officers  who  are  called  upon  to  administer  it  are  bewildered  in 
the  mazes  of  conflicting  enactments.  In  many  instances  even  pro- 
fessional skill  is  baffled.  Upon  this  point  we  may  refer  to  a  very 
recent  declaration  of  the  first  judicial  officer  in  the  State.  Says 
Chief  Justice  Church  (62  New  York  Eeports,  p.  459) :  "  It  'is 
scarcely  safe  for  any  one  to  speak  confidently  of  the  exact  condition 
of  the  law"  in  respect  to  public  improvements  in  the  cities  of  New 
York  and  Brooklyn.  The  enactments  in  reference  thereto  have  been 
modified,  superseded  and  repealed  so  often  and  to  such  an  extent 
that  it  is  difficult  to  ascertain  just  what  statutes  are  in  force  at  any 
particular  time."  The  uncertainties  arising  from  such  multiplied 
and  conflicting  legislation  lead  to  incessant  litigation,  with  all  its 
expensive  burdens,  public  and  private.  When  we  reflect  upon  tliese 
manifold  mischiefs  and  the  heavy  tax  thus  imposed  upon  the  public 


16  [Assembly 

in  payinp;  the  expenses  of  prolonged  legislative  sessions,  and  support- 
ing judicial  tribunals  to  dispose  of  the  great  volunie  of  litigation 
thus  occasioned,  we  are  justified  in  pronouncing  legislative  interpo- 
sition in  the  affairs  of  cities  as  an  evil  of  the  first  magnitude. 

5.  But  this  is  not  all,  nor  the  worst.  It  may  be  true  that  the  first 
attempts  to  secure  legislative  intervention  in  the  local  affiiirs  of  our 
principal  cities  were  made  b}'  good  citizens  in  the  supposed  interest 
of  reform  and  good  government,  and  to  counteract  the  schemes  of 
corrupt  officials.  The  notion  that,  legislative  control  was  the  proper 
remedy,  was  a  serious  mistake.  The  corrupt  cliques  and  rings  thus 
sought  to  be  baffled  were  quick  to  perceive  that  in  the  business  of 
procuring  special  laws  concerning  local  affairs,  they  could  easily  out- 
match the  fitful  and  clumsy  labors  of  disinterested  citizens.  The 
transfer  of  the  control  of  the  municipal  resources  from  the  localities 
to  the  Capitol  had  no  other  effect  than  to  cause  a  like  transfer  of  the 
methods  and  arts  of  corruption,  and  to  make  the  fortunes  of  our 
principal  cities  the  traffic  of  the  lobbies.  Municipal  corruption, 
previously  confined  within  territorial  limits,  thenceforth  escaped  all 
bounds,  and  spread  to  every  quarter  of  the  State.  Cities  were  com- 
pelled by  legislation  to  buy  lands  for  parks  and  places  because  the 
owners  wished  to  sell  them  ;  compelled  to  grade,  pave  and  sewer 
streets  without  inhabitants,  and  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  aw^ard 
corrupt  contracts  for  the  work.  Cities  were  compelled  to  purchase, 
at  the  public  expense  and  at  extravagant  prices,  the  property  neces- 
sary for  streets  and  avenues,  useless  for  any  other  purpose  than  to 
make  a  market  for  the  adjoining  property  thus  improved.  Laws 
were  enacted  abolishing  one  office  and  creating  another  with  the 
same  duties,  in  order  to  transfer  official  emoluments  from  one  man 
to  another  ;  and  laws  to  change  the  functions  of  officers  with  a  view 
only  to  a  new  distribution  of  patronage,  and  to  lengthen  the  terms 
of  offices  for  no  other  purpose  than  to  retain  in  place  officers  who 
could  not  otherwise  be  elected  or  appointed. 

If  any  one  questions  the  mischievous  results  of  these  practices  he 
has  but  to  note  the  increase  of  debt  and  taxation  in  the  city  of  New 
York  from  1860  to  the  present  time,  during  which  legislative  inter- 
vention in  the  local  afiairs  of  that  city  has  been  most  extensively 
asserted.  The  debt  has  increased  from  eighteen  millions  to  one 
hiindred  and  thirteen  millions;  and  taxation  for  annual  expenditures 
from  nine  to  twenty-eight  millions. 

Remedies  of  the  Evils  Enumerated. 

"We  now  approach  the  s])ecific  task  set  l)efore  this  commission, 
namely,  the  methods  of  redress  and  reformation. 

It  will  narrow  the  field  of  inquiry  here,  if  we  first  exclude  those 
schemes  of  improvement,  sometimes  suggested,  which  ofl'er  no  assur- 
ance of  effective  relief,  because  they  deal  with  the  symptoms  rather 
than  the  disease,  such  as  — 

1.  A  carefully  contrived  system  of  laws  for  the  punishment  of 
neglect  or  unfaithfulness  in  municipal  officers.  This  remedy  is  one 
of  the  first  to  suggest  itself.     The  present  difficulty,  however,  does 


No.  68.]  lY 

not  consist  in  the  want  of  adequate  penal  laws,  bat  in  the  lack  of 
abilit}^  to  enforce  those  which  now  exist.  When  unscrupulous  men 
obtain  the  control  of  the  local  administration,  and  revenues  of  a 
community,  the  control  of  the  local  administration  of  justice  is  apt 
to  follow  as  a  consequence.  But,  without  this,  the  unwillingness  to 
excite  the  hostility  of  political  leaders  by  a  public  prosecution,  the 
difficulties  of  proof,  the  delays  and  defeats  incident  to  all  judicial 
proceedings,  deprive  this  remedy  of  all  virtue.  Penal  laws,  however 
severe  or  well  framed,  never  correct  the  miscliiefs  of  bad  systems  of 
government.  Their  object  is  to  repress,  by  the  example  of  punish- 
ment, the  occasional  abuses  in  the  administration  of  good  systems. 

2.  The  immediate  control  of  local  affairs  by  the  Legislature.  It 
is  needless  to  bestow  further  consideration  upon  this  plan.  As 
already  pointed  out,  its  sure  result  is  to  aggravate  the  mischiefs 
sought  to  be  removed.  Instead  of  elevating  the  character  of  the  local 
governing  bodies,  this  practice,  by  depriving  them  of  their  most 
important  functions,  and  inducing  the  belief  that  it  is  of  little  import- 
ance to  make  special  efforts  to  elect  faithful  and  intelligent  local 
guardians,  leads  directly  to  still  further  deterioration  and  decline. 

3.  The  withdrawal  of  power  from  local  governments,  or  the  limi- 
tations of  it  by  positive  enactments.  Hopeless  of  finding  any  other 
method  of  arresting  the  increase  of  debt  and  taxation  of  cities,  some 
have  proposed  that  the  increase  of  debt  beyond  a  certain  prescribed 
amount  should  be  absolutely  prohibited  and  taxation  limited  to  a 
specified  ratio.-  This  is  the  principle  embodied  in  a  proposed  consti- 
tutional amendment  which  received  the  sanction  of  the  Legislature 
at  its  last  session.  Upon  mature  consideration,  we  are  of  opinion 
that  this  expedient  is  not  a  remedial  measure,  and  that  its  incorpora- 
tion in  the  Constitution  would  be  an  error.  The  apparent  prohibi- 
tion, both  as  to  taxation  and  the  per  centage  of  debt,  could  be  readily 
evaded  by  raising  the  assessed  value  to  which  the  ratio  of  taxation 
and  of  debt  would  apply.  Such  restrictions  do  not  attempt  to  pre- 
vent wastefulness  or  embezzlement  of  the  public  funds  in  any  other 
way  than  by  limiting  the  amount  of  the  funds  subject  to  depredation. 
The  effect  of  such  measures  would  simply  be  to  leave  the  public 
necessities  without  adequate  provision. 

4.  The  opposite  suggestion,  namely,  wholly  to  deprive  the  Legis- 
lature of  the  power  of  intervention,  is  equally  inadmissible.  Should 
this  be  done,  and  nothing  else,  the  cities  of  our  State  would  be  left 
entirely  unprotected  against  those  evil  agencies  which  have  seemed, 
in  mau}^  instances,  to  make  a  resort  to  the  central  authority  abso- 
lutely necessary.  It  would  not  be  possible,  even  in  those  cases  of 
all-pervading  corruption  which,  as  they  have  already  happened,  may 
happen  again,  to  obtain  that  summarj^  relief  which  it  is  in  the  power 
of  the  Legislature  to  afford.  We  cannot  ignore  the  lessons  of  the 
last  twenty  years,  which  teach  that  under  our  present  municipal 
establishments,  however  mischievous  the  continual  practice  of  Legis- 
lative intervention  may  be,  the  power  of  occasional  resort  to  it  may 
be  absolutely  necessary, 

5.  To  confer  very  extensive  powers  upon  the  mayor.     It  has  of 

[Assembly,  No.  68.]  2 


18  [Assembly 

late  years  frequently  been  suggested  that  the  corrective  proposed  by 
frequent  popular  elections  fails  of  its  intended  effect,  for  the  reason 
that  under  present  arrangements  there  is  such  a  division  of  powers, 
that  the  people  are  unable  to  discern  the  officials  upon  whom  malad- 
ministration is  really  chargeable.  The  remedy  suggested  is  to  clothe 
the  mayor  with  full  authority  to  appoint  and  remove  all  the  principal 
executive  ofticers  and  then  to  vest  in  the  officers  so  appointed  the 
control  of  the  business  of  raising  and  appropriating  moneys.  It  is 
argued  that  under  such  civil  arrangements  the  people  could  always 
hold  the  mayor  responsible  for  wasteful  or  inefficient  administration, 
and  would  be  sure  to  apply  the  proper  remedy  by  changing  the  head 
of  the  government. 

We  have  no  confidence  in  such  a  scheme.  It  finds  no  support  in 
the  established  ])rincij^les  of  popular  representative  government.  The 
important  functions  of  determining  how  much  money  shall  be  raised 
by  tax  and  of  its  distribution  among  the  various  local  objects  and 
purposes  are  essentially  discretionary,  and  the  officers  who  are  to 
exercise  them  should  be  sensible  of  no  obligations,  restraints  or  fears, 
except  such  as  jn'oceed  from  their  convictions  of  the  public  welfare. 
Few  men  deserving  of  public  confidence  would  accept  such  places  at 
the  hands  of  a  master  wdio  could  make  and  unmake  them  at  pleasure. 

But,  more  than  this,  the  scheme  suggested  places  the  control  of 
vast  suras  of  money' — in  the  city  of  New  York,,  thirty  millions  of 
dollars — a  larger  revenue  than  that  of  some  kingdoms — in  the  hands 
of  a  single  man.  No  such  control  over  the  public  resources  is  lodged 
even  with  the  sovereign  in  any  constitutional  government.  The 
disposition  of  such  a  fund,  absolute  when  once  gained,  would  become 
the  contention,  not  so  frequently  of  those  who  would  prove  faithful 
to  the  trust,  as  of  those  who  sought  it  only  to  betray  it. 

The  assumption  that  with  frequent  elections  the  people  would 
very  soon  depose  an  unworthy  chief  officer,  is  altogether  illusory. 
The  master  of  the  revenues  and  patronage  of  a  million  of  people 
might  not  suffer  himself  to  be  displaced.  The  notion  that  the 
present  failure  of  municipal  elections  to  remove  unworthy  officers  is 
mainly  attributable  to  an  inability  to  trace  the  responsibility  for 
maladministration  to  its  true  source  is  erroneous.  The  real  difficulty 
is  that  the  mass  of  the  citizens,  however  strongly  they  may  be 
convinced  of  the  necessity  of  a  political  change,  arc  not  willing  to 
enter  upon  a  campaign  against  thoroughly  organized  political  com- 
binations, for  the  reason  that  there  is  no  suflicient  prospect  of 
success. 

6.  Civil  service  reform.  However  desirable  it  may  be  to  inti'oduce 
a  reform  which  will  change  the  methods  of  accession  to  minor 
political  offices  from  that  of  political  patronage  to  competitive  exam- 
ination, we  are  pursuaded  that,  under  existing  circumstances,  the 
intensity  with  which  partisan  strife  is  carried  on  within  the  limited 
area  of  "a  municipality  fori)ids  the  hope  of  its  successful  introduction 
until  the  national  and  State  government  shall  have  set  the  example, 
and  demonstrated  the  superiority  of  its  methods. 

Our  municipal  organization   neither   afiords  proper  material  for 


No.  68.J  .  19 

examinino-  boards,  nor  arc  tlie  defects  in  the  municipal  clerical  force 
at  all  important  when  compared  with  other  mischiefs.  This  reform, 
therefore,  as  applied  to  cities,  must  appear  as  quite  inadequate  to 
reach  the  main  evils  that  beset  us.  Hence,  while  leaving  the  Legis- 
lature free  to  adopt  such  civil  service  rules  as  in  its  discretion  it  may 
see  fit,  we  have  not  made  any  special  recommendations  upon  the 
subject. 

7.  The  ])ossibility  of  finding  a  corrective  under  our  present  system 
by  increasing  popular  interest  in  the  affairs  of  .local  governments. 
There  are  those  who  still  insist  that  the  sole  remedy  for  the  evils  we 
are  dealing  with  is  to  be  found  in  further  enlightening  the  mass  of 
the  population  as  to  the  effects  of  misgovernment  upon  their  own 
concerns,  and  in  arousing  the  public  generally  to  the  necessity  of 
exercising  greater  watchfulness  over  local  affairs,  and  exerting  a 
united  power  at  municipal  elections. 

It  might  be  said,  in  answer  to  such  suggestions,  that  the  resolution 
creating  this  commission  is  itself  an  authoritive  declaration  of  the 
insufficiency  of  this  supposed  corrective;  and  that  this  commission, 
which  is  instructed  to  devise  a  plan  tor  the  government  of  cities, 
need  not  occupy  itself  with  suggestions  which  look  to  agencies  for 
relief,  independent  of  government. 

The  better  answer,  however,  is,  that  experience  has  proved  these 
agencies  to  be  wholly  inadequate.  The  theory  of  government  under 
which  rogues  are  permitted  to  gain  possession  of  the  public  purse  as 
an  incentive  to  good  men  to  turn  them  out,  would  not  be  altogether 
absurd,  if  a  reasonable  chance  of  success  in  bafi&ing  the  reprobates 
were  offered.  But  governments  are  not  created  for  these,  or  other 
sentimental  purposes.  They  are  contrivances  to  furnish  protection 
to  the  industrious  citizen,  to  the  end  that  he  may  be  left  to  pursue 
his  private  avocations  with  the  minimum  expenditure  of  time  and 
trouble  in  attention  to  public  affairs.  When  these  contrivances, 
instead  of  affording  him  this  relief,  become  themselves  the' occasion 
of  incessant  watchfulness  and  enormous  expense,  they  fail  in  their 
essential  purpose. 

In  respect  to  the  time  and  attention  of  the  citizen,  the  same  rule 
obtains  as  in  respect  to  his  income.  It  is  only  a  certain  share,  and 
that  comparatively  small,  of  either,  which,  even  in  the  most  public 
spirited  of  communities,  can,  or  will,  be  withdrawn  from  private 
purposes  and  devoted  to  the  public.  The  people  should  not  be  called 
upon  to  make,  in  addition  to  the  payment  of  burdensome  taxes,  a 
large  sacrifice  of  time  and  labor  to  the  unattractive  task  of  protecting 
the  community  against  the  neglect  or  the  fraud  of  those  who  are 
themselves  appointed  to  be  the  public  guardians,  and  liberally  paid 
for  their  services.  When  this  is  necessary  they  abandon  all  earnest 
effort  for  improvement,  and  suffer  extravagance,  wastefulness  and 
inefficiency  to  proceed  unchecked.  This  is  no  small  degree  the 
actual  condition  of  things  at  the  present  moment  in  our  large  cities. 

Even  citizens  of  unusual  public  spirit  and  resolution  who  still, 
notwithstanding  the  disheartening  effect  of  unsuccessful  efforts,  con- 
tinue to  struggle  against  corrupt  and  inefiieient  local  government. 


20  [Assembly 

acknowledge  the  fniitfiilness  of  any  effort  for  improvement  through 
the  regular  instrumentality  of  popular  elections.  Hence  we  have 
societies  for  municipal  reform,  and  similar  voluntary  combinations, 
which  strive  unceasingly  by  laborious  investigations  of  the  local 
administration  and  the  publication  of  results,  and  by  ap])eals  to  the 
Legislature,  to  repress  the  manifold  evils  which  afflict  the  local  com- 
munities. These  efforts  are  a  proof  of  the  existence  of  public  spirit 
and  public  virtue  and  at  the  same  time  a  proof  of  the  extent  to  which 
they  are  crippled  in  their  endeavors.  Tlie  activity  thus  exhibited 
should  be  sufficient  to  accomplish  its  end.  If  our  local  political 
systems  afforded  the  opportunity  they  should  afford  to  such  activity, 
the  evils  thus  struggled  against  would  be  removed  by  the  correctives 
which  frequent  elections  supply,  and  witliout  the  necessity  for  a  resort 
to  these  extraneous  methods. 

We  do  not  lightly  regard  the  efforts  of  public  spirited  citizens  to 
awaken  and  keep  alive  an  active  interest  in  public  affairs.  On  the 
contrary,  w^e  view  them  as  the  main  instrumentalities  by  wliich, 
under  the  existing  system,  the  administration  of  our  local  governments 
can  be  preserved  from  utter  disorder.  The  prime  object  of  legisla- 
tion upon  local  affairs  should  be  to  devise  a  system  under  which  these 
agencies  may  operate  with  effect.  No  fear  may  be  entertained  that 
any  scheme  can  be  contrived  so  perfect  as  not  to  need  the  aid  of  all 
the  vigilance  of  which  the  best  of  our  communities  can  boast. 

This  commission  do  not  apprehend  that  tlierc  v;ill  be  any  substan- 
tial difference  of  opinion  upon  the  statements  or  conclusions  thus  far 
in  this  report  set  forth.  Tlie  actual  evils  and  burdens  under  which 
the  people  of  our  larger  cities  labor  will  not  be  deemed  to  have  been 
exaggerated.  The  immediate  causes  to  which  they  have  been 
imputed  will,  we  think,  be  admitted  to  be  the  true  ones.  The 
inefficiency  of  the  various  remedies  to  which  reference  has  been  made 
can  scarcely  be  doubted. 

The  conclusion  can  no  longer  be  resisted  tliat  our  present  course 
of  local  administration  is  based  upon  some  fundamental  errors  which 
render  it  wholly  inadequate  to  the  government  of  cities,  and  that 
the  work  of  amendment  must  begin  at  the  very  foundation  of  the 
structure. 

Plan  of  thb  Coivimission. 

In  dealing  with  the  general  subject  committed  to  them,  the  com- 
mission was  necessarily  led  into  an  extended  survey  and  examination 
of  the  origin  and  nature  of  our  existing  municipal  corporations ;  the 
relations  which  they  sustain  to  the  sovereign  power  of  the  State ; 
the  character  and  extent  of  the  powers  conferred  upon  them  ;  and 
the  mode  in  which  those  powers  have  been  exercised  and  regulated, 
both  in  reference  to  the  general  functions  of  government  and  to 
those  specially  relating  to  the  vital  question  of  municipal  expendi- 
ture, debt  and  taxation.  This  survey  and  examination  led,  at  an 
early  period,  to  the  fundamental  question,  whether  the  general  appli- 
cation of  universal  suffrage  in  the  election  of  the  local  guardians  and 
trustees  of  the  financial  interests  of  these  public  corporations  was 


N"o.  68.]  21 

in  accordance  with  sound  principles,  or  suitable  to  our  present  con- 
dition. Entertainino;,  however,  a  natural  jealousy  of  any  su2:gestion 
which  might  wear  the  appearance  of  a  departure  from  the  principles 
of  American  polity,  they  preferred  to  direct  their  first  efforts  toward 
the  discovery  of  some  mode  of  rearranging  the  local  administration, 
which,  without  disturbing  the  elective  system,  should  give  promise 
of  a  reform  of  existing  abuses.  As  already  shown,  all  such  efforts 
appeared  to  them,  after  the  fullest  consideration,  to  be  misdirected  ; 
and  the  question  remained,  whether  the  election  by  universal  suffrage 
of  the  local  guardians  of  the  financial  concerns  of  cities  can  be 
safely  retained.  This  report  has  thus  far  been  largely  devoted  to  a 
recapitulation  of  the  discussions  and  conclusions  through  which  they 
were  led,  or  rather  forced,  to  a  consideration  of  the  principal  ques- 
tion above  stated.  We  have  pursued  this  method  because  we  recog- 
nize and  appreciate  the  natural  disinclination  of  our  citizens  to 
attribute  the  disorders  of  our  political  system  to  the  operation  of 
general  suffrage.  After  the  most  careful  deliberation,  our  conclu- 
sion is  that  the  choice  of  the  local  guardians  and  trustees  of  the 
financial  concerns  of  cities  should  be  lodged  wnth  the  tax-payers. 
To  admit  to  a  participation  in  such  choice,  those  who  make  no  con- 
tribution to  the  funds  to  be  administered  is  not  in  conformity  with 
the  principles  on  which  human  affairs  are  conducted,  and  is  a  depar- 
ture from  the  general  policy  of  this  State,  as  frequently  declared  by 
the  Legislature.  ' 

The  Principle  on  which  it  Rests. 

The  distinction  between  the  general  government  of  the  State  and 
the  government  of  its  local  divisions — very  important  to  be  observed 
— are  often  overlooked.  We  have  heretofore,  in  general  terms, 
adverted  to  them.  They  need  a  more  pointed  statement.  The 
province  of  the  State  government  consists  in  laying  down*  the  gen- 
eral principles  and  determining  the  civil  polity  of  the  State  in  estab- 
lishing the  rights  of  person,  determining  the  conditions  upon  which 
property  may  be  acquired,  held  and  enjoyed,  and  framing  the  gov- 
ernmental agencies  through  which  all  rights  may  be  secured.  All 
these  matters  are  of  general  and  not  merely  local  interest.  They 
concern  all  citizens  throughout  the  State  in  a  similar  manner, 
although  some  may  not  concern  them  in  an  equal  degree. 

For  the  purpose  of  carrying  out  the  general  systems  thus  estab- 
lished, certain  powers  are  intrusted  by  the  State  to  local  officials  for 
special,  administrative  and  local  purposes.  Those  powers  (to  borrow 
the  precise  language  of  Governor  Tilden  in  the  message  already 
referred  to),  "  in  the  most  completely  developed  municipality,  em- 
brace the  care  of  police,  health,  schools,  street  cleaning,  prevention 
of  fires,  supplying  water  and  gas,  and  similar  matters,"  most  conve- 
niently attended  to  in  partnership  by  persons  living  together  in  a 
dense  community,  and  the  expenditure  and  taxation  necessary  for 
those  objects.  The  rights  of  persons,  property,  and  the  judicial  sys- 
tems instituted  for  their  preservation  —  general  legislation — govern- 


22  [Assembly 

ment,  in  its  proper  sense  ;  tliese  fire  vast  domains  which  the  func- 
tions of  municipal  corporations  and  municipal  ofticers  do  not  touch." 

It  is  the  next  to  be  observed  tliat  much  the  larger  part  of  this 
administration  of  the  aifairs  of  municipalities  consists  in  the  raising 
bv  taxation,  from  the  owners  of  property  thei'ein,  a  common  fund 
for  carrvin^;  out  the  local  jiui-poses  above  referred  to  and  the  due 
a])])lication  of  that  fund. 

It  is  this  domain  of  government  proper  which  constitutes  the  true 
field  for  tlie  operation  of  the  principles  and  methods  of  universal 
suffrage.  It  is  here  that  all  actually  possess,  and  feel  that  they 
possess,  both  a  common  and  an  individual  interest,  and  an  interest 
which  will  not,  in  general,  be  either  bartered,  betrayed  or  neglected, 
and  which  cannot  be  measured  by  any  pecuniary  standard.  The 
rights  of  persons  must  be  equal;  and  though  all  persons  liave  not 
equal  rights  to  property,  they  have  equal  rights  to  equal  rules 
respecting  property.  Tbis  equality  can  be  secured  only  through  a 
legislative  body  in  which  all  are  represented,  and  can  be  maintained 
only  when  the  general  executive  and  judicial  officers  are  subject  to 
responsibility  to  all  alike.  In  the  election  of  the  central  Legislature, 
and  of  all  the  general  executive  and  judicial  officers,  all  citizens 
therefore  should  participate. 

Tiie  case  in  respect  to  the  choice  of  the  local  guardians  of  munici- 
pal funds  is  very  different.  In  all  our  cities  there  are  many  who 
make  no  direct  contribution  whatever  to  these  fun'ds,  and  have  no 
just  title  to  say  how  much  shall  be  exacted  from  other  ])eople,  and  to 
what  ])urposes  the  contributions  should  be  applied.  It  may  be  said 
that  the  burden  of  supporting  government  falls  in  some  manner 
upon  all.  In  a  remote  and  indirect  way  a  small  part  of  the  burden 
of  local  taxation  falls  upon  those  who  do  not  directJy  contribute. 
But  this  is  so  inappreciable,  and  by  them  so  little  understood,  as  to 
be  wholly  immaterial  to  the  })resent  discussion. 

The  nuiin  object  of  local  government,  in  this  respect,  is  to  secure 
faithful  administration  of  financial  trusts  —  to  place  the  control  of 
enormous  sums  of  money  in  the  hands  of  those  who  will  see  that 
they  are  applied  to  their  proper  uses.  Knowing,  as  we  do,  that  this 
control  is,  and  must  necessarily  be,  sought  for  by  those  whose  object 
is  to  pervert  it,  and  who  will  devote  themselves,  with  restless  eftbrt, 
to  the  formation  of  powerful  combiiuitions  to  gain  it,  we  deliberately, 
under  our  present  system,  throw  these  enormous  prizes  into  the  arena 
occupied  by  the  contending  factions.  It  would  indeed  be  strange  if 
the  results  of  such  a  system  were  other  than  we  find  them.  Our 
object  is,  or  should  be,  to  select,  from  the  community,  such  guardians 
as  prudent  stockholders  would  choose  to  manage  the  concerns  of  a 
great  corporation.  The  plan  adopted  hitherto  seems  no  better  adapted 
to  secure  a  good  administration,,  than  a  mode  of  election  in  a  railway 
corporation,  by  which  conductors,  brakeraen,  truckmen,  engineers 
and  passengers  should  have  an  equal  right  with  stockholders,  to  vote 
for  directors.  Indeed,  when  our  present  system  is'fairly  subjected  to 
the  test  of  ])rinciple,  there  seems  to  be  little  room  for  argument.  It 
stands  self-condemned. 


No.  6S.]  23 

Its  Accordance  with  the  Established  Policy  of  the  State. 

Tlio  establitjlied  ])olicy  of  this  State,  in  respect  to  the  administm- 
tion  of  the  financial  concerns  of  municipalities,  admits  the  limitation 
of  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  snifrage  on  questions  of  expenditure 
and  taxation  to  the  tax-paying  portion  of  the  community. 

From  the  fact  that,  in  elections  for  city  officers,  all  voters  partici- 
pate, it  has  come  to  be  a  common  belief  that  the  question  of  submit- 
ting the  local  government  of  cities,  in  all  respects,  to  the  full  opera- 
tion of  universal  suffrage,  has,  after  the  fullest  consideration  of  the 
Legislature  and  people  of  the  State,  been  deliberately  adopted. 
This  is  an  error,  the  correction  of  which  we  deem  of  great  import- 
ance ;  not  because  the  question  of  the  wisdom  and  expediency  of 
the  policy  depend  upon  whether  it  has  heretofore  been  established, 
for,  if  such  were  the  fact,  the  policy  should  be  reversed,  if  found 
mischievous,  but  because  all  considerable  errors  upon  so  important  a 
subject  greatly  obstruct  the  pathway  to  a  just  conclusion. 

The  question  to  wliich  we  now  draw  attention 'is  not  whether  the 
policy  of  the  State  has  been  to  intrust  parts  of  the  local  governments 
of  cities  to  the  operation  of  general  suffrage,  but  whether  such  has 
been  its  policy  in  relation  to  their  financial  concerns.  It  is  import- 
ant here  to  consider,  first,  what  a  city  is  in  respect  to  the' question 
under  discussion.  It  is  not  the  name  of  the  corporate  form  which 
gives  a  city  its  character  as  such  ;  but  the  fact  that  its  inhabitants 
live  closely  together  —  in  other -words,  that  the  population  is  urban 
as  distinguished  from  rural.  Wherever  the  pursuits  of  agriculture 
are  displaced  by  those  of  manufacturers,  trade  or  commerce,  dense 
populations  spring  up,  which  require  local  governments  radically 
different  from  those  of  the  sparsely  settled  rural  districts.  The  dis- 
tinctions between  such  populations  are  obvious;  but  the  consequences 
of  such  distinction  are,  in  general,  not  sufficiently  apprehended. 
Wherever  a  few  thousand  people  come,  from  whatever  cause,  to 
dwell  in  close  proximity  to  each  otiier,  the  necessity  arises  for  a  local 
government  framed  to  suit  the  needs  of  a  compact  population.  The 
country  highways  do  not  suffice  ;  streets  are  needed ;  cleanliness, 
comfort  and  health  are  to  be  attended  to ;  the  streets  must  be  regu- 
lated, paved  and  cleaned  ;  gutters,  sidewalks  and  sewers  must  be 
constructed.  A  conflagaration  would  bring  a  common  peril ;  and 
common  provision  must  be  made  for  the  prevention  of  fires.  Dense 
populations  stimulate  vice,  immorality,  and  consequent  turbulence 
and  crime,  and  provision  nllist  be  made  for  a  suitable  police.  All 
these  interests  are  peculiar  to  such  a  population,  and  the  necessary 
expense  must  be  defrayed  by  contributions  levied  exclusively  within 
the  area  inhabited  by  it.  Wherever  such  a  population  exists,  though 
it  may  be  very  small,  a  government  in  the  nature  of  a  city  govern- 
ment is  required. 

It  was  remarked  by  the  late  Mr.  Justice  Nelson,  in  an  opinion 
noted  for  its  ability,  delivered  in  the  year  1835,  in  the  Supreme 
Court  of  this  State,  "that  any  person  who  will  look  into  the  powers 
and  privileges  conferred  upon  towns  and  counties,  and  their  qualified 
right  of  self-government  in  reference  to  their  domestic  relations,  and 


24  [Assembly 

into  the  charter  of  the  several  cities  and  villages,  will  not  fail  to 
perceive  that  the  only  essential  difference  which  exists  between  tiiese 
corporate  bodies  arises  mainly  from  the  difference  in  the  extent  of 
their  territory,  the  density  of  their  population,  and  the  nature  of 
their  occupation." 

In  the  State  of  New  York  there  are  some  one  hundred  and  twenty 
villages,  all  of  which  possess  a  form  of  local  government  which  con- 
tains the  general  features  of  city  charters.  In  the  establishment  of 
these  governments  the  Legislature  has  had  before  it,  in  each  instance, 
the  question  to  whom  it  should  intrust  the  control  of  tinancial  con- 
cerns. The  univ^ersal  general  solution  given  to  this  question  has 
been  to  intrust  them  to  the  tax-payers  alone.  The  village  executive 
officers,  the  board  of  trustees,  the  local  Legislature  of  the  village  are 
elected  b}'  voters  possessing  the  ordinary  qualifications ;  but  the  vote 
of  the  tax-paying  electors  is,  with  certain  exceptions  presently  to  be 
noticed,  requisite  to  confer  the  authority  to  raise  money  by  taxation. 
In  the  instances  of  the  first  village  charters  no  tax  whatever  was 
permitted  to  be  raised  except  by  the  authority  of  a  vote  of  the  tax- 
payers ;  but  it  was  found  that  there  were  certain  annually  recurring- 
expenses,  small  in  amount,  and  usually  of  about  the  same  sum, 
which  it  was  a  matter  of  course  to  supply  ;  and  the  Legislature  in 
many  instances,  to  save  the  inconvenience  of  a  separate  vote  of  a 
separate  body  of  electors,  at  a  village  meeting,  introduced  into  num- 
bers of  the  village  charters  carefully  guarded  provisions  authorizing 
the  boards  of  trustees  to  raise  by  tax  sums  limited  in  amount, 
usually  a  few  hundred,  sometimes  a  few  thousand  dollars,  for  these 
regular  and  inevitable  expenditures;  but  for  any  unusual  object 
requiring  the  expenditure  of  any  considerable  sum,  the  authority  to 
levy  a  tax  was  and  is  carefully  restricted  to  the  tax-payers  ;  and  it  is 
to  be  observed  that  any  proposition  for  the  raising  ot  an  unusual  tax, 
when  submitted  to  the  tax-payers,  must  state  the  objects  and  pur- 
poses to  which  the  money  is  to  be  applied,  so  that  the  contributors  to 
the  fund  ])ass  judgment  upon  the  objects  of  the  expenditure  as  well 
as  upon  the  amount  to  be  raised. 

Provisions  adopting  the  method  above  pointed  out  will  be  found 
in  the  charters  of  all  or  nearly  all  the  villages  of  the  State  which 
were  incorporated  prior  to  the  passage,  in  1847,  of  the  general  law 
for  the  incorporation  of  villages;  and  the  form  in  which  they  were 
generally  embodied  may  be  illustrated  by  a  citation  from  a  village 
charter,  selected  at  random,  that  of  tl,>^  village  of  Geneseo,  incor- 
porated in  1845.  '    . 

"Section  G.  Every  person  residing  in  the  said  village,  and  pos- 
sessing the  qualifications  prescribed  b}'  the  Constitution  to  authorize 
him  to  vote  for  elective  officers,  may  vote  at  such  annual  meeting 
for  any  officers  to  be  elected  thereat ;  but  no  person  shall  vote  upon 
any  proposition  to  raise  a  tax  or  appropriate  the  same  at  any  such 
meeting  unless  he  shall  at  the  same  time  be  liable  to  be  assessed  for 
such  tax." 

The  Constitution  of  184(5  made  it  the  duty  of  the  Legislature  to 
provide  by  general  law  for  the  incorporation  of  villages,  and  accord 


No.  68.]  26 

ingl}^  tlie  general  act  of  1847,  above  referred  to,  was  passed,  and 
continued  in  force  until  it  was  superseded  by  the  general  village 
incorporation^act  of  1870.  Both  these  acts  reaffirmed  and  adopted 
the  same  principle  of  discrimination  in  the  exercise  of  the  suftrage, 
giving  the  election  of  officers  to  the  electors  generally,  but  commit- 
ting questions  of  expenditure,  with  the  exception  of  small  amounts 
for  ordinary  purposes,  to  tax-payers  alone.  Many  of  the  cities  of 
the  State  grew  up  out  of  village  organizations,  and  their  charters 
usually  contain  the  same  discrimination.  The  charters  of  Bingham- 
ton,  Kingston,  Oswego,  Ogdensburg,  Elmira  and  Long  Island  City 
are  referred  to  as  instances. 

This  Policy  Plainly  Applicable  to  All  Cities. 

It  may  be  asked  why  this  policy  of  the  State  so  frequently  declared 
by  the  Legislature  in  reference  to  all  villages  and  the  smaller  cities, 
has  not  also  been  applied  to  the  larger  cities  ?  That  financial  con- 
cerns should  be  thus  carefully  placed  under  the  control  of  the  tax- 
payers in  those  smaller  communities,  where  the  number  of  the  unre- 
flecting or  the  vicious  population  and  the  facilities  for  successful 
combinations  among  greedy  aspirants  for  the  control  of  public  pat- 
ronage and  plunder  are  comparatively  small,  and  that  these  obvious 
safeguards  should  be  wholly  omitted  in  the  great  cities,  is  a  striking 
anomaly.  This  anomaly  is  not,  however,  we  are  glad  to  say,  the 
result  of  deliberation,  but  rather  of  accident.  It  should  be 
explained. 

The  question  whether  these  concerns  should  be  intrusted  to  the 
control  of  universal  sufii'rage  or  to  that  of  tax-payers  only,  could  not 
arise  in  the  convention  which  fi-amed  the  Constitution  of  1821.  That 
convention  preserved  the  restriction  of  the  right  of  suffrage  in  all 
cases  to  owners  of  property.  In  1826  the  people  of  the  State,  by  an 
amendment  of  the  Constitution,  almost  wholly  abrogated  the  prop- 
erty qualification.  The  convention  of  1846  did  not  adequately  deal 
with  the  questions  arising  respecting  the  local  government  of  cities 
and  villages.  At  that  tiuie,  as  we  have  already  shown,  the  control 
of  financial  concerns  was,  in  all  villages,  and  most  of  the  cities, 
lodged  with  the  tax-payers,  through  the  instrumentality  of  a  system 
of  direct  voting  upon  the  questions  themselves.  In  respect  to  the 
metropolis,  the  Legislature  itself  annually  passed  upon  the  question 
of  all  the  expenditures,  and  as  to  many  of  the  expenditures  of  other 
large  cities.  Moreover,  the  evils  of  wasteful  and  corrupt  adminis- 
tration had  then  scarcely  begun  to  develop  themselves  to  a  degree 
sufficient  to  command  attention  ;  and  the  convention  contented  itself 
with  an  express  delegation  to  the  Legislature  of  the  duty  of  providing 
by  general  law  the  requisite  legislation  for  cities  and  villages.  That 
duty,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  villages,  has  been  performed  in  the  man- 
ner already  indicated.  In  respect  to  cities,  especially  the  larger 
ones,  it  could  hardly  be  performed  by  the  Legislature  alone.  To 
commit  the  control  of  financial  affairs,  even  in  respect  to  extraordi- 
nary expenditures  and  debt,  to  a  direct  vote  of  the  tax-payers,  was 
hardly  possible.     This  method  is  applicable  only  to  small  commuui- 


2G  [AsJSEMBLT 

ties  and  to  very  simple  concerns.     To  extend  it  to  great  cities,  like 
the  metropolis,  would  be  impracticable. 

The  establisiiment  of  a  re])resentative  body,  to  be  chosen  by  the 
tax-payers,  is,  therefore,  the  proper  method  by  which  they  can  con- 
trol the  question  of  expenditure  and  taxation  in  laT:ge  cities;  but  the. 
provisions  of  the  Constitution,  declaring  in  effect  that  all  elective 
officers  are  to  be  chosen  by  universal  suffrage,  stands  in  the  wa}'  of 
such  a  procedure.  The  result  is  that  the  Legislature  has  been  com- 
pelled to  leave  the  great  concerns  of  debt  and  taxation,  for  the  most 
part,  to  the  municipal  councils  chosen  by  the  voters  at  large.  That 
these  councils,  under  such  a  system,  siiould  degenerate  into  what  we 
now  find  them  is  inevitable  under  such  a  policy.  In  answer  to  the  earn- 
est appeals  of  citizens  against  the  peculations,  wastes,  malversations 
and  disorders  thus  engendered,  the  Legislature  has,  in  many  instances, 
taken  to  itself  the  performance  of  local  functions,  and  disposed  of 
the  questions,  how  much  money  a  city  should  raise,  and  to  what 
objects  it  should  be  applied.  Evils  still  more  alarming,  developing 
themselves  under  this  practice,  the  central  authority  has  felt  the  neces- 
sity of  refraining  from  the  discharge  of  functions  so  inappropriate, 
and  has  again  devolved  them,  as  to  the  metropolis,  upon  the  local 
authority,  but  this  time,  upon  a  hybrid  bod}',  composed,  in  part,  of 
heads  of  executive  departments,  of  course  disinclined  to  enforce 
economy  against  themselves,  and,  consequently,  disqualified  to 
impose  it  upon  others.  The  commission  created  in  1872  for  the 
amendment  of  the  Constitution,  perceived  the  anomaly  we  have 
pointed  out-,  and  the  necessity  of  the  creation  in  large  cities  of  a 
board  representative  of  the  tax-payers,  under  whose  guardianship 
the  prime  matters  of  debt  and  taxation  should  be  placed,  and  recom- 
mended an  amendment  of  the  Constitution  designed  to  remedy  the 
evil.  For  reasons  not  involving,  it  is  believed,  a  dissent  on  the  part 
of  the  Legislature  from  the  principles  thus  embodied,  the  recom- 
mendation failed  to  be  put  in  the  authoritative  sha{)e  requisite  for 
its  submission  to  the  people. 

From  this  review  of  the  policy  of  tlie  State,  we  are  justified  in 
affirming  that  the  people  and  the  Legislature,  while  providing  for 
the  organization  of  dense  populations  under  corporate  forms,  enabling 
the  people  to  govern  themselves  —  and  while  entrusting  to  the 
electors,  without  discrimination,  the  election  of  the  chief  magistrates 
and  of  the  local  legislatures,  whose  province  it  was  to  provide  for 
the  common  welfare  —  have,  at  the  same  time,  committed  the  control 
of  the  expenditure  of  money  to  the  body  of  voters  from  whom  the 
money  to  be  expended  must  be  raised.  The  deviations  from  this 
practice  have  arisen  from  causes  which  the  Legislature  could  not 
control,  and  constitute  an  anomaly  which  is  the  real  source  of  our 
existing  disorders. 

In  recommending,  as  we  do,  the  establishment  of  a  uniform  system 
based  upon  the  fundamental  principle  of  i-epresentative  government, 
that  the  assembly  which  votes  the  taxes  should  be  elected  by  those 
who  contribute  toward  the  taxes  imposed,  we  remove  an  anomaly, 
but   suggest   no   innovation.     On    the  contrary,  we  recognize   and 


No.  08.]  27 

extend  the  establislied  ])olicy  of  tlie  State,  and  provide  a  mode  by 
which  it  can  everywhere  be  conveniently  administered. 

Some  Objections  Considered. 

Before  leaving  this  subject,  a  few  observations  njay  be  made  to 
meet  some  probable  objections.  1.  The  fact  that  the  sums  raised 
for  town  purposes  are  voted  upon  by  all  the  electors  may  be  sug- 
gested as  qualifying  our  statement  respecting  the  policy  of  the  State. 
This  circumstance  really  constitutes  no  ground  for  such  a  qualifica- 
tion. The  present  mode  of  voting  the  town  taxes  was  adopted  at 
a  time  when  none  but  tax-payers  voted.  And  after  the  property 
qualification  was  modified  by  the  constitutional  amendment  of  1S2G, 
no  evil  of  sufficient  magnitude  displayed  itself  to  suggest  the 
expediency  of  a  change  in  this  particular.  All  our  observations 
have  been  confined  to  the  question  of  expenditure  as  it  arises  in 
connection  with  dense  populations,  as  in  the  case  of  cities  and  vil- 
lages. The  density  and  magnitude  of  the  population  form  the  con- 
trolling consideratii>n.  In  this  respect  there  is  a  distinction  between 
rural  and  urban  communities.  In  the  former  the  proportion  of  the 
proprietors  to  the  whole  population  is  much  larger  than  in  the 
latter  ;  and  wiien  we  include  with  the  proprietors  the  voting  mem- 
bers of  their  families,  and  others  whose  interests  are  so  closely 
identified  with  theirs  as  to  be  incapable  of  separation,  we  find  that 
in  committing  questions  of  expenditure  to  the  voters  at  large  they 
remain  practically  within  the  control  of  the  tax-payers.  Again,  in 
rural  communities  the  reckless  and  vicious  part  of  the  population 
is  small,  separated  and  comparatively  incapable  of  being  organized 
and  led  by  unscrupulous  political  managers  seeking  control  of  tiie 
common  fund,  and  that  fund  itself  is,  in  general,  so  small  as  to  offer 
little  temptation  to  greed.  An  additional  safeguard  is  found  in 
the  free  and  open  discussion  of  the  town  meeting.  These  conditions 
seem  to  so  far  diminish  the  dangers  of  abuses  in  the  management 
of  town  expenditures  as  to  render  unnecessary  any  discrimination 
between  the  control  of  expenditures  and  the  other  objects  of  the 
local  government. 

Even  here,  however,  it  is  to  be  observed  that  the  Legislature, 
when  providing  for  the  raising  and  outlay  of  considerable  suras,  has 
reaffirmed  the  fundamental  distinction  we  have  insisted  upon.  It 
has  also  incorpoi'ated  it  in  the  free  school  system  of  the  State  by 
provisions  securing  the  control  of  the  expenditures  of  each  district 
to  the  taxable  inhabitants  of  such  district,  to  whom  the  annual  budget 
is  submitted,  and  who  vote  upon  it  in  detail.  So  also  with  tlie 
numerous  laws  permitting  towns  to  borrow  money  for  aiding  in  the 
construction  of  railroads  and  other  similar  purposes.  Those  only 
who  are  liable  as  tax-payers  to  pay  the  debt  are  permitted  to  have  a 
voice  on  the  question  of  its  creation. 

2.  It  may  be  said  that  the  discrimination  insisted  upon  should,  if 
a  just  one,  be  applied  to  the  general  government  of  the  State,  and 
the  control  of  the  State  expenditures  be  confined  to  those  who  con- 
tribute to  them.     But  here  the  discrimination    is   not  practicable. 


28  [Assembly 

Those  expenditures  must  necessarily  be  regulated  by  the  general 
Legislature:  and  as  tliis  body  has  the  general  function  ot  deter- 
mining the  rights  of  all  the  citizens,  and  tiie  rules  by  which  every 
member  of  the  community  is  to  be  governed,  popular  government 
requires  that  it  should  be  the  representative  of  the  whole  popula- 
tion. Fortunately,  State  expenditure,  though  large,  is  small  when 
compared  with  the  aggregate  sums  raised  for  local  purposes,  and  the 
members  of  the  central  legislature  occupy  a  position  of  influence 
and  responsibility  wider  than  members  of  municipal  boards.  As 
to  such  State  exj)enditures  the  Constitution  of  1846  has  made  detailed 
and  wise  provisions,  both  as  to  their  purposes  and  the  increase  of 
the  debt,  which  have  proved  of  such  efficacy,  that  the  burdens  ,they 
impose  are  easily  borne,  and  the  sinking  fund, will,  in  a  few  years, 
entirely  relieve  us  from  a  State  debt.  Moreover,  the  objects  to 
which  the  State  funds  arc  applied  are  widely  distributed,  and  the 
facilities  for  combinations  to  control  them  greatly  diminished.  The 
administrative  precautions  and  methods  which  we  recommend,  are 
those  which  the  natural  laws  underlying  human  affairs  demand. 
These  laws  cannot  be  disregarded  by  societ}^  any  more  than  by 
individuals,  without  disaster. 

3.  It  may  be  suggested,  even  by  those  who  agree  with  the  views 
we  have  expressed  as  to  the  necessity  in  our  cities  of  a  body  repre- 
sentative of  the  tax-payers,  that,  by  reason  of  a  popular  belief,  how- 
ever unfounded,  that  such  a  measure  would  be  an  encroachment 
upon  the  principal  of  universal  suflTrage,  it  will  be  impossible  to 
procure  its  adoption.  We  have  not  overlooked  this  suggestion.  It 
would  be  a  sufficient  answer  to  it  to  say  that  this  commission  was 
constituted  for  the  purpose  of  devising  a  plan  of  local  government 
calculated  to  reach  and  remove  those  evils  which  have  assumed 
alarming  proportions.  •  It  would  be  a  wholly  inadequate  discharge  of 
this  grave  duty  if  we  should  hesitate  to  give  effect  to  our  deliberate 
conviction  because  of  apprehensions  that  they  may  arouse  preju- 
dices and  even  meet  with  serious  resistance.  To  recommend  a  sys- 
tem in  accordance  with  sound  principles  of  government,  and  neces- 
sary to  the  preservation  of  our  municipal  institutions,  is  our  plain 
duty.  The  responsibility  of  accepting  or  rejecting  it  rests  upon  the 
Legislature  and  the  people.  But  it  is  a  better  answer  to  say,  that 
this  measure  is,  in  our  opinion,  a  just  one,  and  must  sooner  or  later 
be  accepted  and  adopted. 

All  that  is  needed  to  bring  the  })ublic  niind  to  an  acceptance  of 
these  conclusions,  is  to  secure  its  attention  to  the  overwhelming 
importance  of  the  subject.  Hitherto  it  has  received  no  adequate 
public  discussion.  A  full  comprehension  of  the  vast  interests  at 
stake  must  overcome  this  indifference.  The  twenty-four  cities  of 
the  State  exhibited,  according  to  the  census  of  1875,  a  population  of 
2,213, 373,  while  the  entire  population  of  the  State  was  '1,33(»,210. 
The  assessed  aggregate  value  of  the  property  subject  to  taxation  in 
these  cities  was  $1,516,449,596,  while  the  assessed  value  of  the  whole 
property  in  the  State  at  the  same  time  was,  in  round  numbers, 
^2,000,000,000.     The  vast  financial  concerns  of  these  great  coramu- 


No.  68.]  29 

nities,  representing  one-lialf  of  the  population,  and  tliree-fourths  of 
the  property  of  the  State,  cannot,  without  ruin  to  the  general  inter- 
ests, be  sunxmdered  to  the  control  of  contending  factions,  organized 
for  political  and  personal  aggrandizement. 

When  the  question  is  fairly  met,  without  reference  to  party 
interests,  it  will,  we  think,  be  clearly  perceived  that  objection  to  it, 
founded  upon  any  supposed  violation  of  the  principle  of  general 
sufl^'rMge,  proceeds  from  a  total  misconception.  It  is  not  proi)Osed  to 
interfere  with  that  principle  in  any  particular  affecting  legislation 
which  establishes  the  general  rights  or  obligations  of  citizens.  The 
choice  of  all  State  ofKcers,  of  members  of  the  Legislature, 
of  the  chief  executive  officers  of  cities,  of  local  bodies,  which 
frame  the  ordinances  providing  for  the  public  health,  peace 
and  order,  is  left  wholly  untouched.  All  that  is  proposed  to  be  done 
is  to  place  the  concerns  of  local  taxation  and  expenditure  within  the 
control  of  those  who  contribute  to  the  local  funds  to  be  raised  and 
expended ;  and  this,  as  already  shown^  is  not  in  violation  of  the 
principle  of  popular  suffrage,  but  in  strict  conformity  to  it,  and  also 
in  conformity  to  the  general  policy  of  the  State,  as  repeatedly 
declared. 

The  measure  we  recommend  is  not  in  opposition  to  the  principle 
of  general  suffrage,  but  in  support  of  it — as  much  so  as  if  the  sole 
duty  of  this  commission  had  been  to  consider  how  that  principle 
could  be  best  preserved  and  perpetuated.  No  surer  method  could 
be  devised  to  bring  the  principal  of  universal  suffrage  into  discredit, 
and  prepare  the  way  for  its  overthi'ow,  than  to  pervert  it  to  a  use  for 
which  it  was  never  intended,  and  subject  it  to  a  service  which  it  is 
incapable  of  performing. 

Even  now  sarcasm  and  ridicule  are  frequeutl}'  leveled  against  the 
system  of  universal  suffrage,  as  if  it  were  a  contrivance  unsuited  to 
any  department  of  human  affairs.  Such  criticism  seems  wholly  mis- 
directed. This  principle,  justly  applied,  is  the  true  foundation  of 
our  government,  and  a  leading  source  of  our  strength  and  pros])erity 
as  a  nation.  It  is  not  the  use,  but  the  abuse  of  the  principle  that 
can  ever  bring  it  into  contempt  or  endanger  its  preservation.  To 
expect  frugality  and  economy  in  financial  concerns  from  its  opera- 
tions in  great  cities,  where  perhaps  half  of  the  inhabitants  feel  no 
interest  in  these  duties,  is  to  subject  the  principle  to  a  strain  for 
which  it  is  not  designed,  and  which  it  cannot  bear.  All  true  friends 
of  the  system  should  unite  in  rescuing  it  from  such  perils. 

Enough  has  now  been  said  to  vindicate  the  conclusion  of  this  com- 
mission that  a  body  representative  of  the  tax-paj-ers  is  necessary  as 
an  integral  part  of  the  local  government  of  cities.  Inasmuch  as  this 
conclusion  enters  into  the  plan  to  be  proposed  by  them  as  a  funda- 
mental element,  it  has  seemed  to  us  best  that  a  vindication  of  it 
should  precede  t!)e  statement  of  the  scheme. 

Details  of  the  Plan  of  the  Commission. 

In  the  preparation  of  the  plan  proposed,  the  commission  have 
endeavored  to  keep  coustautly  iu  view  the  distinction  between  what 


30  [Assembly 

\ 

can  be  accomplished  by  legislation  and  what  cannot  be  so  accom- 
plished. Power  bestowed  will  sometimes  be  abused,  and  checks 
ai»;ainst  such  abuse  must  be  employed  ;  at  the  same  time  the  intro- 
duction of  too  numerous  eliecks  tends  to  cripple  the  beneficial  exercise 
of  power.  All  useful  efforts  for  improvement  in  local  government 
fall  witliin  three  general  divisions: 

1.  The  mode  by  which  the  most  competent  and  faithful  local  gov- 
erning bodies  and  executive  ofKcers  can  be  chosen. 

2.  The  vesting  in  these  governing  bodies  ample  powers  for  the 
public  welfare. 

3.  The  interposition  of  checks  to  prevent  the  possible  abuse  of  the 
powers  bestowed. 

Guided  by  these  general  views,  the  commission  propose  a  frame- 
work ibr  the  local  government  of  cities  to  be  incorporated  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  State,  of  which  the  following  are  tlie  principal 
features : 

First.  The  delegation  of  the  entire  business  of  local  administration 
to  the  people  of  the  cities,  free  from  legislative  interference  therewith  ; 
reserving  to  the  State  its  functions  of  making  the  general  laws  under 
which  the  local  affairs  are  to  be  administered,  and  also  a  supervision 
of  the  manner  of  administration. 

Second.  A  chief  executive  officer,  clothed  with  the  authority  of 
general  supervision,  and  with  the  unfettered  power  to  appoint  the 
other  principal  executive  officers,  except  those  two  (the  chief  financial 
and  chief  law  officers),  whose  duties  immediately  affect  the  matter  of 
the  public  expenditures,  and  with  the  power  of  removal,  subject, 
however,  to  the  approval  of  the  governor. 

Third.  A  board  of  aldermen  clothed,  as  now,  with  all  the  legisla- 
tive powers,  except  such  as  relate  to  taxation  and  expenditure,  and 
elected,  as  at  present,  by  the  people. 

Fourth.  A  separate  body  called  the  board  of  finance,  to  be  elected 
by  tax  and  rent-payers,  with  such  powers  only  as  relate  to  taxation, 
expenditure  and  debt,  its  principal  functions  being  to  determine  the 
amount  of  the  annual  expenditure,  and  to  a])])ropriate  to  its  various 
objects  and  purposes.  The  assent  of  this  body  is  made  requisite  to 
the  appointments  of  the  chief  financial  and  law  ofiicers. 

■  Fifth.  A  detailed  plan,  designed  to  be  complete  in  itself,  for  secur- 
ing efficiency,  order  and  frugality  in  the  financial  administration,  and 
to  be  executed  by  the  board  of  finance.     Its  main  features  are: 

1.  The  deterniination  in  eacii  year  of  the  sum  of  money  requisite 
to  be  expended  for  all  objects  and  purposes,  and  what  part  thereof 
is  to  be  raised  by  taxation,  and  the  levying  of  the  hitter  sum. 

2.  The  appropriation  at  the  same  time  of  the  whole  sum  to  be 
expended  to  the  several  objects  and  purposes. 

3.  The  certain  realization  of  the  entire  amount  appropriated  by 
compelling  the  relevying  of  deficiencies  in  the  collection  of  taxes. 

4.  The  prohibitioii  oV  any  expenditure  beyond  the  sums  appro- 
priated by  making  all  contracts  or  engagements  in  excess  thereof  void. 

Sixth.  A  further  enforcement  of  the  maxim  "  pay  as  you  go,"  by 
a  prohibition  against  borrowing  money  or  incurring  debt,  except 
under  certain  specified  conditions,  not  likely  to  arise  often. 


No.  68.]  31 

Necessity  fok  Constitutional  Amendment. 

The  grounds  upon  which  the  incorporation  of  the  entire  plan  in 
tlie  Constitution  has  been  deemed  essential  must  now  be  stated. 

A  princi})al  reason  is  the  necessity  of  stahility.  Our  experience 
has  shown  that  even  a  good  law  requires  time  to  test  its  merits.  In 
the  first  instance,  any  change  brings  with  it  incidental  inconvenience, 
although  such  change  is  from  a  worse  to  a  better  system  ;  additional 
dithculties  arise  from  ignorance  and  misapprehension  of  its  provisions. 
And  such  inconveniences  and  ditliculties  lead  to  impatient  amend- 
ments, which,  in  their  turn,  become  the  source  of  farther  amend- 
ments ;  and  thus,  in  a  short  time,  the  whole  law  becomes  honey- 
combed by  exceptions,  provisos  and  changes,  which  make  it  inopera- 
tive for  good. 

Any  mere  legislative  enactment,  however  carefully  framed,  embody- 
ing the  principles  which  are  contained  in  the  plan  herein  proposed, 
would  annually  inevitably  excite  contention  in  the  legislative  halls 
between  the  friends  of  good  government  and  the  sinister  interest 
excluded  from  future  direct  participation  in  the  fruits  of  taxes. 
Specious  arguments  and  political  exigencies  for  patronage  would  in 
themselves  in  the  future,  as  in  the  past,  be  a  fruitful  source  of  change 
in  the  administrative  departments  of  local  government;  and  parts  of 
the  plan,  however  harmonious,  would  be  compelled  to  give  way  to 
the  pressure  of  party  or  personal  interests. 

These  views  are  well  expressed  by  Governor  Tilden  in  his  mes- 
sage of  the  11th  of  May,  1875,  and  his  opinion  seems  to  have  been 
accepted  by  tlie  Legislature  in  the  concurrent  resolution  providing 
for  the  creation  of  this  commission  by  referring  to  instability  as  the 
source  of  our  evils. 

To  the  extent  that  the  evils  arise  from  instability  thej  can  be 
remedied  only  by  giving  any  plan,  whatever  it  may  be,  the  protection 
from  tiie  encroaching  spirit  of  restless  change,  which  the  Constitution 
alone  afltbrds.  Entertaining  these  views,  we  have  studied  to  reduce 
the  plan  proposed  to  the  most  concise  and  compact  form,  and  to 
exclude  fi-om  it  all  details  of  administration,  except  where  such 
details  were  necessary  to  its  completeness  and  efficiency.  It  is  believed 
that  little  of  superfluity,  either  in  substance  or  expression,  will  be  found 
in  it. 

Another  object  to  be  obtained  is  uniformity.  This  is  declared  in  the 
preamble  to  tlie  joint  resolution  of  the  Senate  and  Assembly  creating 
this  commission  to  be  a  necessity.  As  all  the  provisions  of  the  plan 
proposed  are  capable  of  application  to  all  the  cities  of  the  State,  the 
condition  of  uniformity  is  fully  complied  with.  In  conforming  the 
various  charters  of  different  cities  to  these  provisions,  ciianges  in  their 
details  will  be  undoubtedly  necessary  ;  but  the  plan  proposed  is  uni- 
form, and  all  that  will  be  required  to  give  it  effect  is  to  adapt  the 
existing  charters  of  city  governments  to  the  general  provisions  of  the 
article. 

It  may  be  added,  as  a  further  reason  for  incorporating  the  plan  in 
the  Constitution,  that  it  is  only  by  a  constitutional  provision  that  the 
change  proposed  in  the  method  of  electing  the  board  of  finance  can 


32  [Assembly 

be  accomplished.  In  the  case  of  villages  and  of  small  cities  the  limi- 
tation of  the  exercise  of  the  right  of  siiffraii-e  is  made  a])plicable  by  the 
Lef>;islature  by  provisions  relatins;  to  the  direct  vote  of  the  tax-pay- 
ing- electors  upon  questions  of  debt  and  expenditure  without  interfer- 
ing with  the  methods  prescribed  by  the  Constitution  for  electing  the 
officers  b}'  whom  the  expenditure  is  to  be  made.  In  the  case  of  large 
cities  it  would  be  manifestly  impracticable  to  submit  such  questions 
to  the  vote  of  tlie  tax-payers,  and  the  necessity  of  confiding  the  finan- 
cial administration  of  the  city  to  a  board  of  elective  officers  cannot 
be  seriously  questioned.  A  change  of  the  Constitution  in  this 
important  particular  was  therefore,  in  any  event,  necessary,  and  as 
the  other  provisions  of  the  plan  are  framed  to  a  large  extent  with 
reference  to  and  in  aid  of  the  board  of  finance  and  its  administration 
of  the  finances  of  the  city,  it  is  essential  to  the  pro])er  working  of  the 
plan  that  all  these  provisions  should  be  included  in  the  proposed 
constitutional  amendment. 

It  may  be  thought  that  inasmuch  as  the  carrying  of  the  scheme 
into  full  operation  will  require  further  legislation,  it  would  have 
been  a  useful  supplement  to  the  principal  work  of  the  commission  if 
it  had  drawn  what  might  be  deemed  a  model  charter  ai>plicable  to 
all  cities,  or  forms  of  general  laws  designed  to  give  lull  effect  to  the 
plan  proposed.  This  matter  was  attentively  considered  by  the  com- 
mission, and  the  conclusion  reached  that  neither  of  these  attempts  on 
their  part  would  be  expedient.  The  cities  of  our  State  exhibit  such 
differences  in  magnitude,  in  the  nature  of  the  populations,  their 
pursuits,  and  other  leading  features,  that  no  single  charter  embracing 
the  provisions  usually  contained' in  such  instruments  could  be  well 
contrived.  Provisions  quite  necessary  for  one  city  would  be  useless, 
or  worse  than  useless,  in  another.  The  devising  of  a  general  plan 
applicable  to  all  cities  was  the  duty  devolved  upon  this  comn)ission  ; 
and  they  are  of  the  opinion  that  in  constructing  such  general  plan 
it  would  be  hazardous  to*  enter  upon  more  minute  details  than  are 
exhibited  by  the  one  here  proposed.  Similar  observations  may  be 
made  in  respect  to  the  suggestion  of  general  laws  designed  to  carry 
the  scheme  into  full  effect.  It  would  be  premature  to  present  any 
such  laws  in  advance  (jf  the  adoption  of  the  proposed  constitutional 
amendments,  and  they  could  not  be  adequately  framed  except  by  a 
body  having  before  it  the  representatives  of  the  different  local  gov- 
ernments, to  the  end  that  their  varying  needs  might  be  the  better 
ascertained  and  accommodated  to  the  change  in  the  fundamental 
law. 

The  following  is  the  text  of  the  plan  which  this  commission  recom- 
mends in  the  form  of  an  addition  to  the  Constitution  : 

ARTICLE. 

Section  1.  The  power  of  the  Legislature  to  provide  for  the  organ- 
ization and  government  of  cities  shall  be  exercised  in  accordance 
with  the  provisions,  and  subject  to  the  limitations  and  restrictions 
hereinafter  contained,  and  the  powers  and  franchises  of  every  exist- 
ing  city  government   must   be   exercised  in  conformity  therewith. 


No.  68.]  33 

The  Legislature  shall,  at  its  first  session  after  the  adoption  of  this 
article,  provide  by  law  for  carrying  into  effect  all  the  provisions  con- 
tained therein. 

§  2.  City  elections  shall  be  held  separately  from  the  State  and 
national  elections,  and  in  March  or  April. 

§  3.  The  legislative  power  conferred  on  any  city  shall  be  vested 
in  a  board  of  aldermen,  to  be  elected  by  the  electors  qualified  under 
article  second  of  the  Constitution,  which  shall  be  the  common  coun- 
cil of  said  city;  but  no  power  hereinafter  vested  in  the  board  of 
finance  shall  l3e  conferred  on  or  exercised  by  the  board  of  aldermen. 
In  case  of  a  veto  of  any  legislative  act  of  the  board  of  aldermen  by 
the  mayor,  the  board  shall  have  power  to  pass  the  same,  notwith- 
standing the  mayor's  veto,  by  a  recorded  vote  of  two-thirds  of  all 
the  members  elected,  provided  that  such  vote  be  taken  at  the  next 
meeting  of  the  board  after  the  communication  of  the  veto. 

§  4.  The  executive  power  of  every  city  shall  be  vested  in  the 
mayor  and  in  such  executive  ofiicers  and  departments  as  may  be 
created  by  law.  The  mayor  shall  be  the  chief  executive  officer  of  the 
city,  and  he  shall  see  to  the  faithful  performance  of  their  duties  by 
the  several  executive  officers  and  departments  thereof.  He  shall  be 
elected  by  electors  qualified  under  article  second  of  the  Constitu- 
tion, for  such  term,  and  he  shall  receive  such  compensation  as  the 
Legislature  may  prescribe.  He  shall  nominate,  and  with  the  con- 
sent of  the  board  of  finance,  appoint  the  chief  officer  or  head  of  the 
financial  department,  and  the  chief  law  officer  or  head  of  the  law 
department ;  and  he  shall  have  power  to  appoint  the  head  or  chief 
ofiicers  of  the  other  executive  departments.  With  the  written  appro- 
val of  the  Governor,  the  mayor  may  remove  the  head  or  chief  officers 
of  any  executive  department.  He  shall  have  power  to  investigate 
their  accounts  and  proceedings  ;  have  access  to  all  books  and  docu- 
ments in  their  offices,  and  may  examine  them  and  their  subordinates 
under  oath,  as  to  all  matters  relating  to  the  performance  of  their 
official  duties.  He  shall  also  have  power  to  veto  any  legislative  act 
of  the  board  of  aldermen.  The  mayor  may  be  removed  by  the 
Governor  for  cause,  as  in  the  case  of  sheriffs ;  and  in  case  of  such 
removal,  the  Governor  shall  appoint  a  mayor  to  fill  the  vacancy,  who 
shall  hold  office  until  the  next  succeeding  city  election,  at  which  elec- 
tion a  mayor  shall  be  elected  for  tlie  full  term  of  the  office.  The 
Legislature  shall  provide  for  the  filling  of  a  vacancy  in  the  office  of 
mayor,  otherwise  occurring,  until  the  next  succeeding  city  election, 
and  also  for  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  the  mayor  during  his  tem- 
porar}'  absence  or  disability.  Heads  of  departments  shall  have  power 
to  appoint  and  remove  their  subordinate  officers  and  employes,  but 
the  Legislature  may  regulate  by  law  tiie  qualifications  for  such 
appointments,  and  the  conditions  of  such  removals. 

§  5.  There  shall  be  elected  in  every  city  of  this  State  a  board  of 
finance,  to  consist  of  not  less  than  six,  nor  more  than  fifteen  mem- 
bers. In  cities  having  a  population,  according  to  the  State  census 
next  preceding  the  election,  of  over  100,000  inhabitants,  the  board 
of  finance  shall  be  elected  by  the  electors  of  the  city  (otherwise  qual- 

[Assembly,  No.  68,]  3 


34  [Assembly 

ified  under  article  second  of  tlic  Constitution),  who  shall,  for  two 
years  next  prccedinjj^  the  election,  have  paid  an  annual  tax  on  prop- 
erty owned  by  them,  and  olticially  assessed  fur  taxation  in  such  city, 
of  the  assessed  value  of  not  less  than  $500,  or  sliall  have  actually 
])aid  duriuf^  the  same  period  a  yearly  rent  for  ])remises  in  said  city 
occupied  by  them  for  purposes  of  residence  or  lawful  business,  of  not 
less  tlian  $250.  In  cities  having  a  population,  acccording  to  the 
State  census  next  ])receding  the  election,  of  not  more  than  100,000 
inliabitants,  the  board  of  finance  shall  be  elected  by  the  electors  of 
the  city  (otherwise  qualified  under  article  second  of  the  Constitu- 
tion), who  shall,  for  two  years  next  preceding  the  election,  have 
paid  an  annual  tax  on  property  owned  by  them  and  officially  assessed 
for  taxation  in  such  city,  or  shall  have  actually  paid  during  the 
same  period  a  yearly  rent  for  premises  in  said  city  occupied  by 
them  for  purposes  of  residence  or  lawful  business,  of  not  less  than 
$100.  In  cities  having  a  population,  according  to  the  State 
census  next  preceding  the  election,  of  not  more  than  25,000  inhabi- 
tants, the  lioard  shall  consist  of  six  members.  In  cities  having  a 
population  of  over  25,000  inhabitants,  and  not  more  than  !^50,000, 
it  shall  consist  of  nine  members.  In  cities  having  a  population  of 
over  50,000  inhabitants,  and  not  more  than  100,000,  it  shall  consist 
of  twelve  members ;  and  in  cities  having  a  population  of  over 
100,000  inhabitants,  it  shall  consist  of  fifteen  liiembers.  At  the 
first  election  one-third  of  the  board  shall  be  elected  for  a  term  of 
one  year,  one-third  thereof  for  a  term  of  two  years,  and  one-third 
thereof  for  a  term  of  three  years ;  and  thereafter  the  term  of  office 
shall  be  three  years.  The  existence  of  any  vacancy  in  the  board 
shall  not  of  itself  suspend  the  exercise  of  its  powers  and  duties. 
The  Legislature  shall,  at  its  first  session  after  the  adoption  of  this 
article,  and  thereafter,  from  time  to  time,  as  may  be  necessary, 
provide  by  general  law  for  the  registration,  in  every  city,  of  electors 
qualified  to  vote  for  the  board  of  finance,  and  for  filling  vacancies 
in  said  board,  and  may  change  the  number  of  members  of  which  the 
said  board  shall  consist  in  any  city,  provided  that  the  number  shall 
not  in  any  case  be  less  than  six,  and  that  one-third  of  the  board 
shall  be  elected  annually. 

§  6.  The  board  of  finance  shall,  in  every  fiscal  year,  make  esti- 
mates of  the  sums  of  money  necessary  for  the  proper  administration 
of  the  city  government  during  the  next  fiscal  year,  and  which  are 
to  be  raised  by  taxation  or  supplied  by  the  revenue  of  the  city 
derivable  from  other  sources,  and  applicable  to  general  purposes. 
Such  estimates  shall  include  the  sums  rocjuisite  for  the  pa^yment  of 
the  interest  on  bonds  or  other  city  debts  drawing  interest,  the  prin- 
cipal of  auy  debts  payable  during  the  year,  judgments  against  the 
city,  the  sums  sufficient  to  make  good  all  deficiencies  in  the  payment 
of  taxes  on  personal  estate  for  the  last  preceding  year,  and  any 
deficiencies  in  the  collection  of  taxes  on  real  estate  for  any  preceding 
year  which  may  be  found  by  the  board  to  be  uncollectible,  and  also 
any  deficiencies  in  the  collection  of  the  estimated  revenues  from 
vOther  sources,  and  all  other  sums  required  by  law  to  be  raised    by 


No.  68.]  35 

taxation.  The  estimates  shall  also  separately  state  the  a<^gregate 
amount  of  moneys  in  the  treasury  or  receivable  durino;  the  next 
fiscal  year,  applicable  to  general  purposes,  in  which  may  be  inchided 
any  prior  unexpended  appropriations  which,  in  the  judajment  of  the 
board,  may  not  be  required  to  meet  existing  liabilities  ;  and  shall,  in 
like  manner,  separately  state  the  aggregate  amount  to  be  raised  by 
t;axation.  The  board  shall  submit  the  estimates,  when  completed, 
to  the  mayor,  who  shall,  within  ten  days  thereafter,  return  the  same 
to  the  board,  with  his  approval,  or  with  his  objection,  if  any  he 
have,  in  writing,  specifying  the  items  objected  to  ;  and  the  items 
thus  objected  to,  but  no  others,  shall  bo  reconsidered  and  finally 
determined  by  the  board.  The  board  shall,  after  the  return  of  the 
estimates  by  the  mayor,  and  the  action  of  the  board  upon  the 
items  objected  to,  if  any,  or  in  the  event  of  a  failure  of  the 
mayor  to  return  the  same  as  above  required,  proceed  by  reso- 
Intion  to  declare  the  estimates  to  be  final  and  adopted,  and  the 
several  sums  of  money  therein  estimated  as  necessary,  shall  become 
and  be  appropriated  to  and  for  the  departments  and  ofiicers  therein 
mentioned,  and  for  the  objects  and  purposes  therein  mentioned.  The 
aggregate  amount  to  be  raised  by  taxation  shall  be  stated  in  such 
resolution,  and. shall  thereupon  be  levied  and  collected  in  the  manner 
provided  by  law  for  the  levying  and  collecting  of  the  city  taxes.  The 
board  of  finance  may,  during  any  current  fiscal  year,  by  a  unanimous 
vote,  and  with  the  approval  of  the  mayor,  in  case  of  pestilence,  con- 
flagration, or  other  unforseen  public  calamity,  transfer  sums  of  money 
appropriated  to  one  department,  object  or  purpose,  and  not  required 
to  satisfy  existing  liabilities,  to  another  department,  object  or  purpose. 
A  vote  of  a  majority  of  the  entire  board  shall  be  necessary  to  the 
passage  of  any  measure  or  resolution  ;  and  a  vote  of  two-thirds  ot 
the  entire  board  shall  be  necessary  to  the  adoption  of  the  estimates 
hereinbefore  provided  for,  or  any  item  thereof,  or  to  autliorize  tiie 
issue  of  any  stock  or  bonds,  and  in  such  other  cases  as  are  hereinafter 
specified.  It  shall  be  the  duty  of  the  several  departments,  boards 
and  officers,  and  the  common  council,  to  furnish  all  such  statements 
and  accounts  as  the  board  of  finance  may  require,  and  at  such  times 
and  in  such  manner  as  the  said  board  may  prescribe ;  and  the  board 
of  finance  shall  also  have  |)Ower  to  examine  the  books  and  papers  of 
the  several  executive  departments  and  officers,  and  to  examine  such 
officer^  upon  oath,  concerning  their  official  business. 

§  Y.  No  debt  or  liability  shall  be  incurred  by  any  department, 
board  or  any  officer  in  any  city,  unless  there  shall  be  at  the  time  an 
unexpended  appropriation  applicable  thereto  sufficient  to  satisfy  the 
same  and  all  debts  and  liabilities  previously  incurred  and  payable  out 
of  such  appropriation  ;  and  all  contracts  and  engagements  in  contra- 
vention hereof  shall  be  void.  Nor  shall  any  debt  or  liability  of  the 
city  be  paid,  except  out  of  money  in  the  treasury  appropriated  to 
the  purpose  of  paying  such  debt  or  liability.  No  city  government, 
or  any  department  thereof,  shall  grant  any  extra  compensation  to  any 
officer,  servant,  agent,  contractor,  or  emploj^e. 

§  8.  The  Legislature  shall  itself  have  no  power  to  pass  any  law 


36  [Assembly 

for  the  opening,  making,  paving,  lighting,  or  otherwise  improving  or 
maintaining  streets,  avenues,  parks  or  places,  docks  or  wharves,  or 
for  any  other  local  w^ork,  or  improvement  in  or  for  a  city,  but  all 
authority  necessary  for  such  purposes  shall  be  by  law  conferred  on 
the  city  government ;  nor  shall  the  IjCgisUiture  im])ose  any  charge  on 
any  city  or  civil  division  of  the  State  containing  a  city,  except  by  a 
vote  of  two-thirds  of  all  the  members  elected  to  each  house.  Ariy 
local  work  or  improvement,  in  or  for  a  city,  the  cost  of  w^hich  is  to 
be  wholly  ])aid  by  the  city  at  large,  must  be  authorized  by  resolution, 
passed  by  tlie  vote  of  two-thirds  of  all  the  members  elected  to  the 
board  of  aldermen  and  board  of  finance  respectively.  Any  such 
work  or  improvement,  the  cost  of  which  is  to  be  wholly  paid  other- 
wise than  by  the  city  at  large,  must  be  authorized  by  the  vote  of 
two-thirds  of  all  the  members  elected  to  the  board  of  aldermen,  with 
the  consent  of  a  majority  in  interest,  to  be  ascertained  in  such  manner 
as  the  Legislature  may  prescribe,  of  '4W  the  owners  of  land  within 
the  district  of  assessuient  limited  for  the  cost  of  such  work  or  improve- 
ment. Any  such  w'ork  or  impi'ovement,  the  cost  of  which  is  to  be 
paid  in  part  by  the  city  at  large,  and  in  part  by  local  assessment, 
must  be  authorized  by  a  resolution  passed  by  the  vote  of  two-thirds 
of  all  the  members  elected  to  the  board  of  aldermen  and  board  of 
finance,  respectively,  with  the  consent  of  a  majority  in  interest,  to 
be  ascertained  as  hereinbefore  directed,  of  all  the  owners  of  the  land 
within  the  prescribed  district  of  assessment. 

§  9.  No  money  shall  be  borrowed  by  any  city  government  for 
the  purpose  of  defraying  any  of  the  expenses  of  the  city  for  which, 
an  appropriation  has  been  made,  except  in  anticipation  of  tiie  reve- 
nue of  the  year  in  which  the  same  may  be  borrowed,  applicable  to 
such  purposes ;  and  all  moneys  so  borrowed  must  be  paid  out  of 
such  revenue,  or  out  of  revenues  specially  provided  to  supply  any 
deficiency  in  the  collection  thereof  ;  provided,  however,  that  tem- 
porary loans,  in  anticipation  of  taxes,  may  be  renewed,  so  far  as 
such  taxes  may  not  have  been  collected,  when  tiie  same  are,  in  the 
opinion  of  the  board,  fully  secured  by  valid  liens  on  real  estate. 
No  city  shall  borrow  any  money  for  any  other  purpose,  except  under 
and  in  accordance  with  the  following  conditions  and  limitations,  in 
addition  to  any  other  conditions  and  limitations  contained  in  the 
Constitution  ; 

1.  The  debt  must  be  for  some  single  work  or  object  enly,  and 
must  be  authorized  by  a  resolution  passed  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds 
of  all  the  members  of  the  board  of  finance,  and  approved  by  the 
mayor,  distinctly  specifying  such  work  or  object,  and  the  amount  of 
the  debt  to  be  incurred. 

2.  The  Legislature  must,  before  the  creation  of  such  a  debt,  assent 
thereto  by  a  law  passed  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  all  the  members 
elected  to  each  house.  Such  law  shall  also  distinctly  specify  the 
single  work  or  object  for  which  the  debt  is  created,  and  the  amount 
of  the  debt  authorized,  and  shall  contain  provisions  for  a  sinking 
fund  to  meet  the  same  at  maturity,  and  requiring  at  least  ten  per 
cent  of  the  principal  to  be  annually  raised  by  taxation  and  paid  into 
the  sinking  fund. 


No.  68.]  37 

§  10.  Except  as  prescribed  by  the  first  section  of  this  article,  no 
change  in  the  organization  of,  or  in  the  distribution  of  powers  in, 
a  city  government,  or  in  the  terms  or  tenure  of  office  tlierein,  shall 
be  made  by  the  Legislature,  unless  by  an  act  passed  upon  the  appli- 
cation of  the  city,  made  by  resolution  both  of  the  board  of  alder- 
men and  of  the  board  of  finance,  respectively,  approved  by  the 
mayor,  or  by  an  act  which  shall  have  received  the  sanction  of  two 
successive  Legislatures. 

E-BMAKKS    ON   THE    FoEEGOING    ARTICLE. 

Seotion  1.  Legislative  Power  of  the  State. 

This  section  declares  that  the  legislative  power  to  provide  for  the 
organization  and  government  of  cities,  which  has  hitherto  been  little 
qualified  by  any  constitutional  restrictions,  shall  hereafter  be  exer- 
cised in  accordance  witl^the  provisions,  and  subject  to  the  limitations 
contained  in  the  succeeding  sections  ot  the  article. 

It  also  provides  that  the  powers  and  Iranchises  of  every  existing 
city  government  must  be  exercised  in  conformity  wiih  the  provisions, 
limitations  and  restrictions  contained  in  the  article. 

This  section  strikes  at  the  root  of  one  of  the  main  evils  of  our 
existing  municipal  system — improvident  legislative  control  and 
interference,  but,  at  the  same  time,  recognizes  and  asserts  the  power 
of  the  Legislature  over  all  municipal  corporations,  subject  to  the 
express  provisions  of  the  article  now  proposed. 

"  All  legislative  power  is  conferred  on  the  Senate  and  A.ssembly, 
and  if  an  act  is  within  the  legitimate  exercise  of  that  power,  it  is 
valid,  unless  some  restriction  or  limitation  can  be  found  in  the  Con- 
stitution itself.  The  distinction  between  the  United  States  Constitu- 
tion and  our  State  Constitution  is,  that  the  former  confers  upon 
Congress  certain  specified  powers  only,  while  the  latter  confers 
upon  the  Legislature  all  legislative  power.  In  the  one  case  the 
powers  specifically  granted  can  only  be  exercised.  In  the  other,  all 
powers  not  prohibited  may  be  exercised,"  {People  v.  Flagg,  46 
!N".  Y.,  401,  401.)  The  Legislature  is  left  free  to  grant,  alter  or 
amend  city  charters,  as  heretofore,  except  that  as  to  the  particulars 
provided  for  by  the  express  terms  of  this  article  every  charter  granted, 
or  to  be  granted  by  the  Legislature,  must  be  made  to  conform 
thereto. 

No  political  powers  are  intended  to  be  vested  in  the  cities  as 
against  the  State  (see  People  v.  Morris^  13  Wend.,  325) ;  but  the 
exercise  of  those  powers  is  intended  to  be  controlled  and  regulated 
according  to  the  provisions  of  this  article. 

Existing  city  governments  nuist  adapt  their  administration  to  the 
requirements  of  the  article,  in  such  manner  as  the  Legislature  may 
direct,  where  the  article  itself  does  not  furnish  the  rule  of  action. 

The  general  design  of  this  article,  together  with  the  subsequent 
provisions  relative  to  the  power  of  the  State,  may  be  thus  briefly 
expressed : 


38  [Assembly 

First.  To  remit  tho  business  of  local  administration  to  the  people 
of  the  localities. 

Secoiid.  To  reserve  to  the  State  its  ])roper  function  of  providing 
the  general  methods  for  the  conduct  of  such  business,  and  exercising 
a  supervision,  when  necessary,  over  such  conduct. 

Sectiori  2.  Charter  Elections. 

These  arc  to  be  held  separately  from  the  State  and  national  elec- 
tions, and  in  March  or  April. 

New  York,  Brooklyn  and  Buffalo  are  the  only  cities  in  the  State 
in  which  the  charter  elections  are  held  simultaneously  with  the 
general  elections.  In  a  majority  of  the  other  cities  the  charter 
elections  are  held  in  the  spring,  and  either  in  March  or  April. 
This  section  is  designed  to  secure  uniformity  in  respect  to  time,  and, 
so  far  as  possible,  the  permanent  divorce  of  municipal  elections 
from  the  annual  State  elections  in  all  the  ci^es  of  the  State.  The 
question  of  the  separation  of  the  elections  irt  the  city  of  New  York 
has  l)cen  a  fruitful  source  of  debate  and  experiment.  From  1834  to 
1849  the  charter  election  was  lield  in  the  spring.  From  1850  to 
1856  it  was  held  in  the  fall,  simultaTieously  with  the  general  election. 
From  1857  to  1809  it  was  held  in  December.  Under  the  existing 
charter  of  1870  the  election  is  held  simultaneously  with  the  State  elec- 
tion in  November.  The  reasons  which  have  prevailed  during  the 
greater  part  of  the  thirty-three  years,  covered  by  the  dates  justgiven,  to 
separate  the  municipal  election  from  the  general  election,  have  seemed 
to  tho  commission  to  apply  with  special  force  at  this  time.  In  entering 
on  a  new  era  of  munici])al  government,  it  is  certainly  to  be  expected 
that  our  citizens  will  take  a  new  interest  in  the  administration  of 
local  affairs,  and  that  the  newly-aroused  activity  of  our  people  for 
the  prevention  of  abuses  and  the  permanent  good  management  of 
municipal  finances,  will  manifest  itself  in  every  canvass  and  election. 
To  insure  the  maximum  of  intelligent  interest  in  regard  to  the  nom- 
ination and  election  of  municipal  officers,  there  must  be  the  minimum 
admixture  of  other  political  elements,  and  tliis  can  only  be  attained 
by  a  permanent  separation  of  the  charter  election  from  the  national 
and  State  elections.  It  is  a  mistake  to  sui)pose  that  the  municipal 
elections  fail  to  bring  out  a  full  vote  in  the  large  cities.  A  careful 
comparison  of -the  votes  cast  in  the  city  of  New  York  at  the  charter 
elections  and  the  general  elections  during  all  the  years  from  1834  to 
1874,  discloses  the  fact  that  in  many  years  the  number  of  votes  cast 
at  the  spring  charter  elections  was  larger  than  the  number  cast  at  the 
fall  general  election  ;  and  that  when  the  elections  were  held  simul- 
taneously, the  votes  cast  for  political  candidates  on  State  or  national 
tickets  largely  exceeded  those  cast  for  the  mayoralty  candidates.  In 
sixteen  elections,  from  1834  to  1849,  the  aggregate  of  the  votes  cast 
for  political  officers  was  9,985  larger  than  those  cast  in  the  same  year 
for  the  mayoralty  candidates,  while  the  whole  number  of  votes  cast  at 
fifteen  elections,  from  1850  to  1874  (both  years  included),  when  the 
general  elections  were  held  simultaneously  with  the  charter  election, 
or  a  few  weeks  later,  shows  a   much   lai-ger   preponderance  of  the 


No.  68.]  "  39 

votes  given  for  political  officers,  the  votes  cast  at  those  fifteen  elec- 
tions for  the  highest  political  officer  being  54,525  in  excess  of  the 
votes  given  for  the  mayoralty  candidates  at  the  same  time.  It  should 
be  observed,  however,  that  the  last-named  period  embraced  a  presi- 
dential election,  at  which  the  vote  was  unusually  large. 

Section  3.  Legislative    Power  of  Cities. 

Whatever  legislative  power  the  Legislature  of  the  State  may  grant 
to  any  city  must  be  vested  in  a  single  board,  to  be  elected  by  general 
suffrage  as  now  provided  by  the  Constitution. 

A  single  board  of  aldermen,  to  be  elected  either  from  the  wards  of 
the  city  or  by  general  ticket,  as  the  several  city  charters  may  pre- 
scribe, is  deemed  the  best  depository  of  legislative  powers.  And  all 
governing  power  requiring  local  legislation  for  its  due  administra- 
tion is  to  reside  in  the  board  of  aldermen,  except  as  to  the  special 
incidents  of  expenditure  and  the  provisions  therefor  which  are  con- 
fided to  the  board  of  finance. 

"  No  power  hereinafter  vested  in  the  board  of  finance  shall  be 
conferred  on  or  exercised  by  the  board  of  aldermen."  This  is  essen- 
tial to  the  objects  for  which  the  board  of  finance  is  created,  and 
imposes  upon  that  board  the  sole  responsibility  for  its  action  in 
respect  to  the  trust  devolved  upon  it. 

The  power  of  the  board  of  aldermen  to  pass  any  legislative  act 
notwithstanding  a  veto  by  the  mayor,  is  regulated  by  requiring  a 
vote  of  two-thirds  of  all  the  members  elected  to  be  recorded,  and 
making  it  imperative  that  such  vote  be  taken  at  the  next  meeting  of 
the  board  after  the  communication  of  the  veto.  The  provision  as  to 
the  time  of  the  overruling  vote  is  designed  both  to  secure 
reflection,  and  also  to  prevent  the  "  log-rolling"  practices  which  are 
facilitated  by  a  holding  in  suspense  of  the  overruling  power. 

Section  4.  The  Executive  Power. 

The  design  of  this  section  is  : 

1.  To  separate  the  exercise  of  executive  from  legislative  or  discre- 
tionary power.  The  discretion  which  passes  upon  the  expediency 
of  measures,  especially  those  involving  expenditure,  should  have  no 
connection  with  the  steps,  such  as  the  making  of  contracts,  requisite 
to  carry  them  into  eti^ect.  These  inconsistent  functions  may,  in  very 
small  communities,  be  united  without  danger.  In  large  ones  the 
union  cannot  fail  to  result  in  extensive  abuse  and  mischief.  Execu- 
tive offices  or  departments  are  therefore  essential. 

2.  In  respect  to  the  mayor,  to  mark,  as  nearly  as  possible,  the  line 
of  prudence  between  the  extremes  of  giving  too  much  and  too  little 
power.  To  bestow  upon  him  the  absolute  power  of  appointment 
and  removal  of  all  the  principal  executive  officers,  would,  in  the 
great  cities,  render  him  an  autocrat.  Responsibility  for  maladmin- 
istration would,  it  is  true,  be  easily  fastened  upon  him  ;  but  to  apply 
the  remedy  of  deposition  from  power  at  an  election  would  be  a  diffi- 
cult task.     To  put  into   the  hands  of  a  single  man   the  control  of 


40  [Assembly 

twenty  millions  of  dollars,  with  liberty  to  use  it  to  keep  himself  in 
place,  would  be  suicidal. 

On  the  other  hand,  to  require  the  concurrence  of  the  aldermen  in 
a])p()intments,  is  to  divide  and  destroy  the  responsibility.  The 
analogies  of  the  federal  and  State  governrrients  are  not  very  useful 
here.  The  Senates  in  both  are  filled  by  a  higher  order  of  men  ;  but 
even  there  mischievous  bargaining  cannot  wholly  be  prevented.  We 
think  it  easier  to  give  the  mayor  the  unfettered  power  of  appoint- 
ment, except  in  two  instances,  and  the  power  to  remove,  with  the 
approval  of  the  Governor.  The  case  would  be  rare  when  a  removal 
is  really  demanded  for  which  the  Governor's  a])proval  could  not  be 
obtained  ;  and  the  exercise  of  this  function  by  the  Governor  is  a 
part  of  that  prudential  suj)ervision  which  rightly  belongs  to  the  cen- 
tral authority.  This  oversight  of  local  administration  is  a  familiar 
and  useful  part  of  our  present  civil  establishment.  It  has  i-arely,  if 
ever,  been  abused. 

The  two  ofticers  whose  conduct  immediately  relates  to  the  ques- 
tions of  expenditure  and  debt  are  excepted  from  the  mayor's  general 
power  of  appointment.  The  best  efforts  of  the  board  of  finance 
might  be  crippled  by  the  presence  of  unworthy  occupants  of  these 
places.  We  think  it  highly  useful  to  give  that  board  a  check  upon 
improper  selections. 

3.  We  think,  also,  that  the  power  to  remove  the  mayor,  now 
reserved  to  the  Governor,  should  be  continued.  The  Legislature 
may  make  his  term  of  office  a  long  one  ;  and  the  plan  proposed  con- 
fers upon  him  a  much  larger  authority  than  such  officers  at  present 
exercise.  Such  removal  might  prove  a  verj^  inadequate  relief  were 
it  merely  to  create  a  vacancy  to  be  filled  by  some  designated  officer 
chosen  for  very  different  purposes.  In  case  of  removal,  therefore, 
the  Governor  should  fill  the  office  by  a  temporary  appointment  until 
an  election  by  the  people  could  be  held. 

4.  Heads  of  executive  departments  hold  important  places.  They 
should  be  held  rigidly  responsible  for  an  efficient  discharge  of  their 
duties.  Until  some  useful  and  practicable  rules  of  "civil  service" 
can  be  devised,  no  better  metiiod  can  be  suggested  than  that  of 
allowing  these  officers  to  select  their  own  subordinates.  Full 
authority  is  reserved  to  the  Legislature  to  prescribe  such  rules  of 
"  civil  service." 

Section  5.     Tlie  Board  of  Finance. 

This  section  provides  for  the  creation  of  the  board.  Its  duties  and 
powers  are  subsequently  specified.  The  objects  sought  to  be  accom- 
plished by  this  section  are  as  follows  : 

1.  To  create  a  body  representative,  exclusively,  of  those  who  con- 
tribute an  appreciable  share  toward  the  public  expenditure.  Con- 
sidering the  extent  to  which  the  burden  of  taxation  in  our  cities  is 
imposed  upon  houses  and  lands,  the  constituency  might  have  been 
limited  to  those  who  pay  such  taxes,  and  many  conveniences  would 
have  thereby  been  saved,  and  with  moderate  restrictions  as  to  the 
value  of   real  estate  requisite   for    qualification,  abuses  could  very 


No.  68.]  41 

easily  be  prevented.  Bnt  the  true  principle  of  representative  gov- 
ernrnent  is,  that  in  the  choice  cf  a  body  which  is  to  control  the  public 
moneys,  all  who  contribute  to  the  fund  should  have  a  voice. 

We  have,  therefore,  included  in  the  constituency  those  who  pay 
rent  above  a  certain  amount,  even  though  they  pay  no  direct  taxes. 
To  what  extent  taxes  upon  houses  fall  upon  the  occupier  instead  of 
the  landlord,  even  when  paid  by  the  latter,  is  a  disputed  question  in 
political  economy ;  but  it  can  scarcely  be  doubted  that  this  burden 
does,  to  some  extent,  fall  upon  tenants. 

It  is  to  be  apprehended  that,  upon  the  adoption  of  the  plan  pro- 
posed, efforts  may  at  once  be  made  by  contending  factions  struggling 
for  the  control  of  the  municipal  power  to  manufacture  voters  by  mak- 
ing tax-payers  of  persons  who  own  no  property.  Such  a  danger 
must  be  guarded  against,  otherwise  this  main  feature  of  the  plan  of 
local  government  at  once  will  become  a  dead  letter.  Such  has  been 
the  case  in  Pennsylvania,  where  the  payment  of  a  tax  is,  by  the  Con- 
stitution, made  a  qualification  to  the  exercise  of  the  privilege  of 
suffrage.  This  requirement  has  been  held  to  be  satisfied  by  the  pay- 
ment of  a  poll-tax,  and  it  is  a  matter  of  course  for  the  political  par- 
ties or  others  desiring  to  carry  an  election  to  pay  the  tax  for  such  of 
their  followers  as  will  not  pay  it  themselves.  It  is  needless  to  say 
that  such  a  practice  in  our  large  cities  would  certainly  result  in  the 
creation  of  a  board  of  finance  in  no  respect  superior  to  the  worst 
examples  of  boards  of  supervisors  or  aldermen  which  our  municipal 
history  exhibits,  and  we  should  have  all  those  evils  thrust  back  upon 
us  from  which  escape  has  been  sought  by  legislative  intervention. 
The  discretionary  power  to  raise  money  by  taxation  must  be  lodged 
somewhere.  By  the  scheme  proposed,  it  is  intrusted  to  the  body 
representative  of  the  tax-payers.  This  will  be  found  to  be  a  sate 
repository,  if  it  is  made  really  representative  of  the  bona  fide  tax- 
payers, but  not  otherwise. 

To  prevent  abuse,  therefore,  we  have  introduced  a  provision 
restricting  the  qualification  in  cities  having  a  population  of  over 
100,000,  to  those  who  have  for  two  years  paid  an  annual  tax  on  not 
less  than  $500  of  property,  or  a  yearly  rent  of  not  less  than  $250. 
This  restriction  is  not  a  departure  from  the  principle  that  all  who 
contribute  should  have  a  voice.  It  is  a  precaution  absolutely  neces- 
sary to  preserve  the  efficiency  of  the  principle.  It  will,  it  is  believed, 
enable  all,  with  some  exceptions,  to  vote  for  members  of  the  board, 
who  now  pay  taxes,  and  many  others  besides.  It  will  exclude  very 
few,  if  any,  bona  fide  tax-payers.  The  provision  as  to  rent-payers 
will  at  once  be  recognized  as  an  extension,  and  not  a  restriction  of 
the  principle  by  which  the  vote  is  secured  to  the  tax-payers,  and  to 
this  extent  is  in  the  direction  of  universal  suffrage.  It  admits  to  a 
voice  in  the  government  of  cities  a  class  who,  though  not  directly  tax- 
payers, appreciably  feel  the  burdens  of  taxation. 

The  precaution  of  specifying  the  amount  of  tax  has  not  been 
applied  to  the  smaller  cities.  In  this  omission  we  have  been  moved 
by  the  consideration  that  the  temptation  in  these  smaller  communi- 
ties to  create  voters  is  much  less,  as  well  as  by  the  fact  that  in  many 


42  [Assembly 

of  these  cities,  as  well  as  in  villages  where  the  payment  of  taxes  is 
now  a  qualification  for  voting  upon  questions  of  expenditure  no 
inininiuni  is  fixed.  The  additional  requirement  of  a  successive  pay- 
ment of  taxes  for  two  years  is  designed  to  further  mark  out  the  class 
of  regular  tax-payers,  to  the  exclusion  of  those  followers  of  some 
faction  for  whom  a  tax  may  be  paid  in  order  to  make  them  voters  at 
a  special  election. 

2.  That  feature  of  this  board  which  limits  the  annually  outgoing 
members  to  one-third  is  designed  to  secure  the  possession  of  that 
knowledge  of  details  so  necessary  to  the  successful  administration  of 
financial  concerns,  and  which  can  be  acquired  only  by  actual 
experience. 

3.  The  provisions  respecting  this  board  are  designed  to  be  self- 
executing.  Further  legislation  will  indeed  be  required  for  the 
adoption  of  a  suitable  system  of  registration,  and  for  other  purposes. 
But  it  is  believed  to  be  expedient  that  in  case  the  plan  siiould  be 
adopted  by  the  people  it  should  go  into  operation  without  awaiting 
the  aid  of  legislation.  To  accomplish  this  result,  it  is  necessary  that 
the  number  of  members  should  be,  in  the  first  instance,  determined ; 
but  exjjcrieuce  may  show  that  the  views  of  the  commission  as  to 
numbers,  may  not,  in  all  instances,  best  suit  the  public  needs,  and 
power  is,  therefore,  reserved  to  the  Legislature  to  change  the 
numbers. 

Section  6.  Principal  Function  of  the  Board  of  Finance. 

The  fruitful  sources  of  much,  if  not  the  most,  of  our  municipal 
d(!l)ts  are  :  First,  the  failure  to  impose  a  tax  levy  sufficient  to  answer 
contemplated  ])urposes.  Second,  the  failure  to  collect  the  taxes 
imposed.  Third,  the  incurring  of  obligations  without  any  appro- 
priations applicable  to  these  payments.  The  uniform  result  of  each 
of  these  practices  is  the  accruing  of  a  distinct  catalogue  of  arrears 
followed  by  the  specif)us  resort  of  funding  by  an  issue  of  bonds. 
Irregular  expenditure,  extravagant  expenditure,  and  debt  are  insep- 
arable companions.  This  section  has  been  carefully  elaborated  to 
prevent  both  extravagance  and  debt,  by  checking  the  tendencies  or 
first  approaches  to  tliem. 

1.  It  requires  an  estimate  to  be  made  by  the  board  before  the 
beginning  of  each  financial  year  of  the  aggregate  amount  of  money 
necessary  to  be  expended  during  the  year,  and  to  be  supplied  by  the 
general  unappropriated  revenue  of  the  city,  if  any,  and  by  taxation. 
All  such  moneys  and  no  others  are  subject  to  appropriation. 

The  board  is  required  to  specify  the  objects  and  purposes  for  which 
the  estimated  sums  are  necessary,  and  to  appropriate  the  whole  of 
tiiem.  This  method  is  designed  to  secure,  beforehand,  a  full  pro- 
vision for  the  results  of  the  city,  and  nothing  more.  It  makes 
provision  for  no  surplus.  The  existence  of  any  surplus  is  a  tempta- 
tion to  irregular  and  excessive  expenditure. 

2.  To  insure  a  full  provision,  the  board  is  required  to  include  in 
these  estimates  sums  sufficient  to  satisfy  every  legal  obligation,  and 
the  most  prominent  of  these  are  enumerated. 


No.  68.]  43 

3.  The  next  requisite  is  to  secure  the  raising  of  the  money.  This 
is  accomplished  by  deducting  from  the  aggregate  amount  required  to 
be  expended  all  general  revenue  receivable  from  other  sonrces  than 
taxation,  and  requiring  the  residue  to  be  raised  by  taxation. 

4.  The  next  step  is  to  insure  the  collection  of  tlie  amount  directed 
to  be  raised  by  tax.  There  must  always  be  deficiencies  here,  and  it  is 
essential  that  full  provision  be  made  to  cover  them.  These  deficien- 
cies may  arise  in  these  ways:  First,  by  failure  to  collect  the  taxes 
on  personal  estate.  To  meet  this  the  board  is  required  to  treat  all 
sucli  taxes  of  the  previous  year  as  may  not  have  been  collected  as 
uncollectible,  and  to  relevy  the  whole  deficiency  thus  caused.  Second, 
by  failure  to  collect  the  taxes  on  real  estate.  These  taxes  are,  in 
general,  fully  secured,  both  as  to  principal  and  interest,  by  the  lien 
on  the  property  taxed,  and  will,  sooner  or  later,  be  paid  in  full.  So 
far  as  they  are  thus  fully  secured  there  is  no  danger  of  arrears.  The 
liberty  allowed  to  anticipate  these  collections  by  the  temporary  bor- 
rowing of  money  on  revenue  bonds  or  certificates,  if  prudently 
guarded,  leads  to  no  abuse.  The  taxes,  as  they  come  in,  extinguish 
both  the  principal  and  interest  of  the  bonds.  But,  in  certain  cases, 
taxes  may  be  erroneously  assessed  and  omissions  made,  and  rebates 
on  payments  in  advance  will  lead  to  some  failure  to  bring  the  receipts 
of  the  tax  levy  up  to  its  nominal  amount.  The  board  is  required 
each  year  to  find  the  amount  of  such  deficiencies  for  any  preceding 
year,  and  cause  these  to  be  relevied. 

5.  Unforeseen  emergencies.  Inasmuch  as  the  policy  of  having  no 
unappropriated  surplus  in  the  treasury  requires  that  the  whole 
amount  of  the  contemplated  expenditure  should,  at  the  outset  of  the 
year,  be  appropriated  to  the  various  objects  and  purposes  of  the 
government,  in  case  any  unforeseen  calamity  should  absolutely 
require  the  expenditure  of  money  for  other  purposes,  there  would  be 
no  fund  to  resort  to.  There  are  two  modes  of  meeting  such  a  con- 
tingency. One  is  by  giving  authority  to  borrow  which  increase  by 
exactly  the  sum  borrowed,  the  amount  of  actual  expenditure.  The 
other  is  by  calling  tipon  the  board  to  cut  down  some  appropriations 
already  made,  where  the  objects  are  not  of  such  immediate  and 
pressing  necessity,  and  apply  the  sums  thus  released  to  the  new 
emergency.  The  objects  tlius  postponed  could  be  fully  met  the  next 
year.  Tlie  commission  prefers  the  latter  method.  The  former  mode 
would  tend  to  insuflicient  original  appropriations  in  the  beginning  of 
the  year.  The  disposition  in  such  cases  always  is  to  make  the  tax 
levy  appear  as  small  as  possible,  and  the  liberty  to  borrow  during  the 
year  in  case  of  an  emergency,  would  encourage  the  practice  of  treat- 
ing many  things  as  emergencies,  which  should  have  been  contem- 
plated at  tlie  slart ;  and  thus  the  amount  of  the  tax  levy  oi-iginally 
ordered  would  fail  of  being  what  it  should  be  —  the  full  measure  of 
the  burden  to  be  imposed.  We  think  the  provision  requiring  the 
unanimous  consent  of  the  board,  and  the  approval  of  the  mayor  to 
any  transfers  of  appropriations,  will  be  a  guaranty  against  abuse. 
As  the  occurrence  for  such  transfers  is  the  existence  of  some  extraor- 
dinary emergency  which  could  not  be  foreseen,  a  fictitious  refusal  of 
a  single  member  need  not  be  apprehended. 


44  [Assembly 

6.  In  matters  of  sncli  importance  as  the  expenditure  of  money, 
the  inclination  sliould  be  toward  restraint.  It  seems  |)riident,  there- 
fore, to  require  a  two-thirds  vote  for  such  item. 

7.  The  other  provisions  of  this  section  carry  their  own  expla- 
nation. 

Section  Y. '  Restriction  on  Deht. 

This  section  is  the  necessary  supplement  to  the  system  of  order 
and  economy  contained  in  section  6.  Similar  provisions  are  now  to 
be  found  in  most  city  charters.  They  are  absolutely  essential  to  the 
prevention  of  extravaj^ance  and  debt. 

Without  such  provisions  the  whole  financial  system  is  at  the 
mercy  of  the  i)eads  of  departments.  Contractors  must  thoroughly 
understand  that  the  powers  of  these  agents  to  charge  the  public  are 
limited.  To  prevent  cases  of  hardship  provision  should  be  made 
whereby  the  fact  whether  an  unexpended  ap})ropriation  exists  may 
be  duly  certified.     Such  provision  is  the  proper  subject  of  a  law. 

Section  8.  Local  Works  and  Improvements. 

This  section  deals  with  local  works  and  improvements,  so  far  as  it 
is  expedient  to  deal  with  them  by  constitutional  provisions.  It 
would  be  quite  desirable  in  many  respects  to  have  a  law,  uniform  in 
its  operations,  relative  to  taking  lands  for  public  purposes,  and  also 
in  relation  to  the  expense  of  opening,  regulating  and  paving  streets, 
constructing  sewers,  etc.  The  framing  of  such  a  law  requires,  how- 
ever, a  careful  consideration  of  the  varying  conditiuns  existing  in 
difi:\irent  cities,  and  the  representatives  of  the  several  cities  should 
be  heard  upon  the  question.  This  commission  have  not  the  powers 
requisite  to  compel  the  necessary  information.  They  can  deal  only 
with  the  general  principles.  The  section  aims  at  the  following 
objects  : 

1.  To  remove  all  immediate  interference  by  the  Legislature  in 
these  local  works.  It  is  hen?  that  such  interp(^sition  has  been  most 
fruitful  in  extravagant  expenditure  and  municipal  debt.  That  pri- 
vate individuals  interested  in  developing  their  own  property,  or  con- 
tractors seeking  profitable  jobs,  should  be  able  to  secure  against  the 
will  of  the  people  of  a  locality  a  mandate  for  the  execution  of  expen- 
sive local  works,  often  miscalled  improvements,  and  to  charge  the 
expense  upon  proj^erty  owners,  vainly  struggling  to  resist  the  impo- 
sition, is  a  not  infrequent  feature  of  recent  legislation.  Such  prac- 
tices should  not  be  permitted.  We  have  endeavored  to  place  this 
branch  of  adniinistration  upon  what  is  believed  to  be  the  just  prin- 
ciple, namely,  that  those  who  pay  for  the  work  should  have  a  voice 
in  determining  whether  it  should  be  undertaken.  The  initial  steps 
in  ordering  inq)rovements  are,  as  heretofore,  to  be  taken  by  the 
aldermen.  The  possible  cases  are  three  in  number,  and  the  princi- 
ple above  mentioned  is  a])plieQ  as  follows  : 

First.  When  the  work  is  to  be  paid  for  by  the  city  at  large,  the 
board  of  finance  represents  the  body  of  contributors  to  it,  and  the 
assent  of  that  board  is  required. 


No.  68.]  45 

Second.  When  it  is  to  be  paid  for  by  special  assessments  upon 
property  supposed  to  be  benefited,  the  assent  of  a  majority  in  inter- 
est of  the  owners  of  such  property  is  requisite. 

Third.  Wlien  it  is  to  be  paid  for  partly  by  the  city  at  large  and 
partly  by  special  assessments  upon  property  benefited,  both  such 
consents  are  requisite. 

2.  Another  provision  of  this  section  is  designed  to  preserve  and, 
at  tlie  same  time,  to  regulate  the  power  of  the  Legislature  to  impose 
special  charges  upon  cities  for  purposes  other  than  local.  The  object 
here  is  to  leave,  according  to  the  present  policy  of  the  State,  the 
business  of  providing  for  such  objects  as  the  support  of  the  poor, 
maintaining  a  sufficient  police,  enforcing  the  local  administration  of 
justice,  supporting  schools,  etc.,  in  the  hands  of  the  people  of  the 
localities.  But  these  objects  are  not  purely  local.  The  people  of 
the  whole  State  have  an  interest  in  them  ;  and  it  is  the  function  of 
the  central  authority  to  secure  their  just  accomplishment.  The 
supervisory  function  of  the  State  is  therefore  preserved,  and  it  may 
itself,  in  case  of  need,  assume  the-  control  of  these  branches  of  the 
administration  and  charge  the  expense  on  the  localities.  Such  an 
emergency,  however,  not  likely  to  occur,  may  reasonably  require  to 
be  evidenced  b}^  a  two-thirds  vote. 

Section  9.  Further  Restrictions  on  Deht. 

Other  provisions  of  our  plan  are  aimed  to  prevent  the  creation  of 
those  debts  which  may  be  called  involuntary,  because  they  arise,  not 
from  direct  design,  from  a  loose  and  irregular  financial  administration. 
The  incurring  of  debts  in  other  ways  than  by  borrowing  money  has 
already  been  prohibited  by  those  provisions  preventing  the  incurring 
of  obligations  in  the  ordinary  course  of  administration,  unless  there 
is  an  existing  appropriation  sufficient  to  satisfy  them.  Borrowing 
money  is  here  particularly  dealt  with. 

It  is  allowed  for  the  purpose  of  anticipating  revenue.  No  evil  can 
come  from  this  permission,  if  the  methods  provided  by  section  six 
for  securing  the  full  collection  of  every  tax  levy  are  carried  out. 
The  revenue  bonds  or  certificates  will  be  extinguished,  principal  and 
interest,  by  the  taxes  as  they  come  in  ;  and  as  no  taxes  can  remain 
permanently  uncollected,  no  revenue  bonds  can  remain  permanently 
outstanding. 

Borrowing  money  for  other  purposes  is  absolutely  prohibited, 
except  in  rare  instances,  and  under  such  conditions  and  safeguards 
as  will  effectually  prevent  any  burdensome  accumulation  of  debt. 
These  conditions  and  safeguards  are  so  explicit  as  to  need  little 
explanation.  The  provisions  requiring  an  annual  contribution  of 
ten  per  cent  to  a  sinking  fund  is  of  great  importance.  The  present 
generation  is  disposed  to  regard  needed  improvements  as  designed 
more  for  posterity  than  for  themselves,  and  thus  to  rid  itself  of  much 
which  ought  to  be  the  subject  of  annual  expenditure.  This  ten- 
dency we  have  endeavored  to  check  by  this  provision. 


46  [Assembly 

Section  10.   Change  in  the  Organization  of  City  Governments. 

Lai-f^e  powers  being  still  ])ossessed  by  the  Legislature  in  reference 
to  the  frame-work  of  city  governments,  it  is  very  important  to  pre- 
vent those  sudden  enactments  which  are  frequently  allowed,  in  the 
press  of  legislative  business,  to  pass  without  snfKcient  consideration. 
Sudden  legislation  is  a])t  to  be  mischievous,  and  often  has  its  origin 
in  unworthy  and  merel,y  personal  motives.  If  immediate  action  is 
really  demanded  for  the  iniblic  welfare,  the  local  governing  bodies 
will  be  the  first  to  ask  for  it.  Pro])oscd  laws,  for  which  they  do  not 
ask,  must  be  of  a  questionable  character.  It  is  ver}'  suitable  that 
upon  such  measures  the  judgment  of  two  successive  Legislatures 
should  be  had. 

Pkoposed  Amendments  of  the  Constitution  in  aid  of  the  General 

Plan. 

Besides  the  additional  constitutional  article  ])roposed  and  explained 
as  above,  the  conmiission  recommend  as  necessary,  in  oi'der  to  give 
full  effect  to  the  existing  provisions  of  the  Constitution  in  harmony 
with  the  requirements  of  the  new  article,  an  amendment  of  the 
twenty-second  section  of  article  three.  This  section,  as  it  now 
stands,  is  as  follows: 

"  §  22.  There  shall  be  in  the  several  counties,  except  in  cities  whose 
boundaries  are  the  same  as  those  of  the  county,  a  board  of  supervisors, 
to  be  composed  of  such  members  and  elected  in  such  manner  and  for 
such  period  as  is  or  may  be  provided  by  law.  In  any  such  city  the 
duties  and  powers  of  a  board  of  supervisors  may  be  devolved  upon 
the  common  council  or  board  of  aldermen." 

The  cit}'  of  New  York  is  the  only  city  whose  boundaries  are  co-ter- 
minous  with  those  of  a  county.  As  the  law  now  stands  the  functions 
of  boards  of  supervisors  in  respect  to  that  city  are  conferred  upon 
the  board  of  aldermen.  This  is  well  enough,  except  in  those  particu- 
lars which  involve  expenditure  ;  and  those  are  quite  important.  The 
existence  of  a  separate  authority  in  the  board  of  aldermen  to  subject 
the  people  to  expense  under  the  name  of  county  charges  would  be 
wholly  inconsistent  with  the  scheme  of  the  board  of  finance.  The 
authority  of  this  board  should  extend  to  all  matters  which  form  the 
subject  of  expenditure.  The  Commission,  therefore,  recommend  that 
the  twenty-second  section  of  the  third  article  of  the  Constitution 
should  be  amended  as  to  stand  and  be  read  as  follows  : 

§  22.  There  shall  be  in  the  several  counties,  except  in  cities  whose 
boundaries  are  the  same  as  those  of  the  county,  a  board  of  supervisors, 
to  be  composed  of  such  members  and  elected  in  such  manner  and  for 
such  period  as  is  or  may  be  provided  by  law.  In  any  such  city  the 
duties  and  powers  of  a  board  of  supervisors  may  be  devolved  upon 
the  board  of  aldermen  thereof,  except  such  duties  and  powers  as 
involve  the  making  of  contracts,  j^'^'ocuring  supplies,  or  creating, 
auditing,  or  allowing  county  charges,  all  which  duties  and  powers, 
whether  now  existing  or  hereafter  to  he  created,  shall  he  exercised  and 
performed  exclusively  hy  the  hoard  of  finance. 


No.  68.]  47 

Another  additional  amendment  is  designed  to  remove  a  supposed 
constitutional  impediment  in  the  way  of  the  adoption  by  the  Legis- 
lature of  a  plan  calculated  to  test  the  merits  of  what  is  known  as 
minority  representation. 

In  respect  to  this  plan  the  commission  remark  that  there  was 
too  great  diversity  of  opinion  in  their  body  as  to  the  expediency  of 
the  adoption  of  the  principle  itself,  which  would  of  course  have  been 
intensified  in  recommending  any  special  scheme  from  among  the 
many  which  have,  for  various  reasons,  commended  themselves  to  the 
judgments  of  those  conversant  with  the  subject.  In  any  event,  the 
ideas  underlying  this  question  are  as  yet  too  novel  and  too  little 
understood  by  the  public  to  justify  their  enforcement  by  constitu- 
tional amendment. 

It  is  suggested,  however,  that  the  Constitution,  at  present,  does 
not  permit  the  trial  of  the  experiment  of  minority  representation  in 
the  local  government  of  cities,  and  that  even  the  very  crude  attempts 
in  this  direction  already  made  in  this  State  may,  for  this  reason, 
prove  invalid.  In  view  of  the  confident  opinions  of  many  distin- 
guished writers  that  this  schenie  will  furnish  substantial  relief  against 
many  existing  mischiefs,  and  as  it  is  not  inconsistent  with  tlie  plan 
recommended  by  this  commission,  while  we  are  not  united  in  an 
approval  of  these  opinions,  we  do  not  think  it  wise  that  the  Legis- 
lature should  be  debarred  from  making  the  experiment. 

It  is  therefore  recommended  that  a  concurrent  resolution  be  passed 
for  the  submission  to  the  people  of  a  proposition  so  to  amend  the 
first  section  of  the  second  article  of  the  Constitution,  that  it  shall 
stand  and  be  read  as  follows  : 

Section  1.  Every  male  citizen  of  the  age  of  twenty-one  years,  who 
shall  have  been  a  citizen  for  ten  days,  and  an  inhabitant  of  this  State 
one  year  next  preceding  an  election,  and  for  the  last  four  months  a 
resident  of  the  election  district  in  which  he  may  offer  his  vote,  shall 
be  entitled  to  vote  at  such  election  in  the  district  of  which  he  shall 
at  the  time  be  a  resident,  and  not  elsewhere,  for  all  ofiicers  that  now 
are,  or  hereafter  may  be,  elective  by  the  people,  and  upon  all  ques- 
tions which  may  be  submitted  to  the  vote  of  the  people  ;  hut  the 
LegislatuTe  may  provide  that  elections  for  members  of  city  boards 
shall  be  so  regulated  as  to  give  to  minorities  a  proportionate  share  of 
representation  tliei'ein.  Provided  that  in  time  of  war  no  elector  in 
the  actual  military  service  of  the  State,  or  of  tJie  United  States,  in 
the  army  or  navj^  thereof,  shall  be  deprived  of  his  vote  by  reason  of 
his  absence  from  such  election  district;  and  the  Legislature  shall 
have  power  to  provide  the  manner  in  which,  and  the  time  and  place 
at  w^hich,  such  absent  electors  may  vote,  and  for  the  return  and 
canvass  of  their  votes  in  the  election  districts  in  which  they  respec- 
tively reside. 

Concluding  Remarks. 

The  submission  of  this  report  completes  the  task  assigned  to  the 
commission.  The  amount  of  time,  labor  and  thought  bestowed  upon 
the  work  are  not  to  be  measured   by  the  mere  text  of  the  amend- 


48  [Assembly,  No.  68.] 

ments  to  tlie  Constitution  which  are  proposed,  or  by  the  summary 
of  views  and  conclusions  therewitii  presented.  The  whole  system  of 
municipal  establishments,  its  nature,  its  objects,  its  defects,  the 
experiments  to  which  it  has  been  subjected,  the  present  condition 
which  it  exhibits,  and  the  means  of  its  improvement,  have  been  the 
subject  of  continuous  and  earnest  investi^-ation,  and  have  been  dis- 
cussed at  letiiTfh,  in  written  papers  and  orally,  at  the  regular  meet- 
ings of  the  commission.  Many  subjects  which  have  received  a  large 
degree  of  attention  are  omitted  as  not  necessary,  in  view  of  the 
results  arrived  at.  No  small  part  of  the  labor  has  consisted  in 
reducing  the  fext  of  the  proposed  amendments  to  the  smallest  pos- 
sible com))ass  while  embracing  within  it  all  the  elements  essential  to 
compl(!teness.  The  force  and  meaning  of  the  ])articular  terms 
employed,  as  well  as  the  scope  and  purport  of  every  general  provi- 
sion have  been  carefully  considered  ;  and  while  it  is  impossible  to 
present  by  reports  of  the  debates  and  deliberations  the  course  of  the 
arguments  and  decisions  of  the  commission,  in  the  same  manner  as 
those  of  more  popular  bodies,  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  they  have 
covered  the  wide  range  which  it  was  necessary  to  explore  in  order  to 
arrive  at  the  results  embodied  in  this  report.  In  these  results  the 
undersigned  members  of  the  commission  concur  ;  and  they  may  be 
permitted  to  close  their  labors  with  the  expression  of  the  hope  that 
the  plan  which  they  propose,  if  it  shall  be  approved  by  the  Legisla- 
ture and  adopted  by  the  people,  may  secure  those  public  benefits 
which  have  been  the  sole  aim  of  the  commission. 
All  of  which  is  respectfulW  submitted. 

WM.  M.  EVAHTS, 
JAMES  C.  CARTER, 
OSWALD  OTTENDORFER, 
WM.  ALLEN  BUTLER, 
JOSHUA  M.  VAN  COTT, 
E.  L;  GODKIN, 
JOHN  A.  LOTT, 
SIMON  STERNE, 
HENRY  F.  DIMOCK, 

Com7nissione7''S. 
Dated  New  York,  February  24,  1877. 

I  concur  in  the  results  of  the  foregoing  report  except  as  to  quali- 
fications of  voters  for  the  board  of  finance,  and  the  powers  of  that 
board  to  appoint  the  law  and  financial  officers.  I  think  the  qualifi- 
cations of  voters  for  the  large  cities  should  be  the  same  as  those  pre- 
scribed for  the  smaller  cities,  and  that  the  board  of  finance  should 
have  no  appointing  power. 

SAMUEL  HAND. 


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